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INTRODUCTION 
Michael Polanyi was born in Budapest, March 12, 1891. His 
education took place in Budapest and later in Berlin, where he 
remained from 1923 until 1933 as a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute for Physical Chemistry. In 1933 he was made Professor 
of Physical Chemistry at Victoria University, Manchester. His 
interests gradually widened to include Social Studies and Phi-
losophy, and in 1948 he was made Professor of Social Studies at 
Manchester. As Gifford Lectur(;:r at Aberdeen, 1951-1952, he de-
veloped thoughts which seven years later were to emerge in his 
central philosophical work, Personal Knowledge. 
Polanyi has been influenced by Bergson and Dilthey, and by 
Existentialism in general. The American Pragmatists, and es-
pecially Dewey, have also had an obvious effect on him. The 
influence of the theories of Gestalt Psychology are evident in 
his work. Finally, his analysis of themes such as knowledge and 
freedom draw to a large extent on his long experience as a 
physical scientist and a member of the SCil;!l:tific community. 
The main thesis of Personal Knowle~e and the ,:cntral theme 
running through much of his philosophical writing is the need for 
1 
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a more adequate, post-critical theory of knowledge. While 
science and the critical movement have brought with them accomp-
lishments of tremendous value to man, nonetheless, an overempha-
sis on the critical process combined with an epistemological 
ideal of strict scientific detachment and objectivity threatens 
to lead the present age into; ihilism, the destruction of all 
meaning and value. Gradually, religion, moraliti, art and the 
social sciences are losing trust and being labeled "unscientific,tI 
while the more exact sciences threaten to become the gods of the 
age. Polanyi would hope that a more adequate theory of knowledge 
will enable modern man to trust his own abilities to know in a 
wide range of fields, extending far beyond the limited realms of 
physical science. 
Knowledge, for Polanyi, is essentially an act of "compre-
hension." It is above all a positive, a-critical activity. The 
negative, judicial, or critical element in knowledge is of great 
value but there are limits to its use. If overempl~sized it can 
lead to the destruction of meaning. 
The intent of this paper is to examin~ in some detail 
Polanyi's idea of "comprehension. t\ The initial chap!.:er explains 
the structure of comprehension in general. The two succeeding 
chapters will examine two activities proper to ~aowledge, name-
3 
1y the use of language and the activity of problem solving, in 
an effort to see these activitii~s as comprehensive in structure. 
The fourth chapter will go on to view the fundamentally a-criti-
cal nature of comprehension and the limitations of the critical 
element in knowledge. Finally, the last chapter will examine the 
appropriateness of this re-ev~luation of knowledge in relation to 
the crisis of the age. 
I. Tm! 3TRUCTL'RE OF COMPREHENS ION 
flThere arc Wllny things tllat a man knowu which he cannot put 
into ,rords. II This might be said to btJ the first principle of 
trl1chacl Polanyils theory of knowledgt!. The phenan-eI.lOD of inef-
fable knowlc.diQ is as old as ,"laD, and FOUllyi i$ far fr(xn ~-.!illg 
the first to take it into account. Artists and men of a creative 
bent have attached more tmportance to this intuitive element in 
knowledge than have the scientifically inclined. But perhaps no 
other philosopher has baco 30 explicit in making this a central 
issue 1n bis approach to knowledge. In takins this stance, Fo-
luny! is setting himself OVGr against the cartesian ideal of 
"clear aQd distinct ideas" and equally against the statement of 
the early \<11ttganltcin, HOf what calUlot be said, the1:Qo£ one must 
be eilent. H1 
~lben a man kno,~. something and cannot say it. Polanyi calls 
this utaclt knowledsa." Many people know how to ride a bicycle, 
yet they could not say fmactly how they do it.. A student may 
recognize the difference between a vcry go(d teacher and a medl-
oere teacher.. However, if he tries to draw up a llf,t: of qoo11-
1 • 
lM:Lchael Polany!. Persoaa.1 Knowle.. (LondOD: Routledge and 
Kegan Ltd., 1958), 87. 
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ties which make this man outstanding, the list is not particular-
ly convincing to an outsider. In a similar way, the connoisseur 
knows his wines and the archeologist knows pottery; yet it is 
quite another talent for either one of them to be able to spell 
out verbally what he knows tacitly. A mathematician who is noted 
for his ability to solve a difficult problem, may be just as re-
markable for his clumsiness in trying to explain how he has come 
upon the particular solution. All these are examples of men who 
cannot adequately explicitate something, even though they have a 
tacit knowledge of the matter. 
The basic explanation for this anomaly is found in a dis-
tinction between two irreducible types of knowing, subsidiary 
knowledge and focal knowledge. Some things are known by being 
attended to directly. These are satd to be known focally. Other 
things are known merely as instruments, while attention is fo-
cused on a task at hand. This Polanyi calls instrumental or 
subsidiary knowledge. In writing a letter, one is not attending 
to the pen in his hand but to the effort of composing a message. 
Yet, people use the pen correctly. They know what they are doing 
in using it. The knowledge one has of a pen he is using while 
writing a letter is subsidiary knowledge, while the knowledge of 
the idea being expressed is focal knowledge. The distinction 
6 
between these two fundamental types of knowledge, can also be ex-
pressed in terms of parts and a whole. A person can know the 
individual parts of a thing without knowing how they go together 
into a whole. Once the whole is grasped, the parts are seen in 
a new way, as contributiDi to the whole. Then the parts are 
known subsidiarily while the whole is the focus of attention. 
These two types of knowledge are irreducible and fundamen-
tally different. When one is attending to a whole and knows its 
parts only subsidiarily in terms of the whole, he cannot at the 
same time be knowing the parts directly, as entities in them-
selves. To emphasize this point, Polanyi casts it in the form 
of a logical disjunction: 
The mutual exclusiveness of the two kinds of knowing can b 
expressed in terms of a logical disjunction. When we know 
something by relying on our awareness of it for the pur-
pose of attending to something else (i.e., we know a parti 
cular for the purpose of attending to a comprehensive en-
tity to which it contributes), we cannot at the same time 
not rely on it for this purpose -- as would necessarily be 
tne case if we attended to it exclusively in itself. l 
It is now possible to explain Polanyi's basic principle 
more fully. "There are things we know but cannot tell," precise 
ly because there are many things which are known only subsidiar-
ily, in terms of the whole to which they contribute. When a 
lMichael POlanyi, "Tacit Knowing," Philosophy Todal, 6 
(Winter, 1962), 239-262. 
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student appreciates a great teacher, the student may be unable to 
make a convincing list of the man's qualities, for the student 
has known these particulars only subsidiarily. Likewise, the 
archaeologist may recognize pottery without being able to specify 
the particulars by which he recognized it, because he knew these 
particulars only subsidiarily_ 
This then, for Polanyi, is the structure of all knowledge. 
Particulars, kno'~ subsidiarily, are tacitly integrated around a 
focus of attention to form a "comprehensive" whole. Thus Polanyi 
refers to all knowledge as "comprehensive. 1I 
The Body: 
The unique nature of the body is the foundation for the 
structure of knowledge outlined above. A man knows his body al-
most entirely in a subsidiary manner. Bodily activity involves 
a complex system of mus~ular activities, at different levels of 
conBc!c~~ness, which are known subsidiarily in terms of the fo-
cal purpose of the activity_ When someone approaches a friend, 
he is not focusing upon the smile on his own face, nor the mus-
cular movements involved in extending his hand and moving his 
legs. All these bodily activities are known subsidiarily, as he 
focuses upon his going-to-meet-this-person. '~hus our awareness 
of ourselves in action is related to our objectives, in the same 
8 
way as our awareness of the parts of a comprehensive en~ity is 
related to our attention fixed on that entity."l 
The body is unique in that it is not seen as external to 
the person. He looks out upon the whole external world from his 
body. An examination of this process of externalizing things 
other than one's body will show more precisely the subsidiary 
nature of the body. Polanyi does this in some detail: 
Our appreCiation of the externality of objects lying out 
side our body, in contrast to parts of our own body, relies 
on our subsidiary awareness of processes within our body. 
Externality is clearly defied only if we can examine an 
external object deliberately, localizing it clearly in 
space outside. But when 1 look at something, I rely for my 
localization of it in space on a slight difference between 
the two images thrown on my retina, on the accommodation of 
the eyes, on the convergence of their axis and the effort 
of muscular contraction controlling the eye motion, supple-
mented by impulses received from the labyrinth, which vary 
according to the pOSition of my head in space. Of all 
these 1 become aware only in terms of my localization of 
the object 1 am gazing at; and in this sense 1 may be said 
to be subsidiarily aware of them. 2 
Bodily existence then, is the foundation of the structure 
of knowledge. The subsidiary awareness we have of our body is 
the pr~e analogate for other examples of subsidiary awareness 
and makes them possible. Polanyi refers to bodily existence as 
lMichael Polanyi, "Clues to an Understanding of Mind and 
Body," The Scientist Speculates, ed. I.J. Good (London: Heine-
mann, 1962), 7I-78. 
2Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 59. 
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"indwelling. " One dwells within his body in knowing at.d using 
external things. To speak of dwelling within the body is another 
way of saying that the body is known subsidiarily in all bodily 
activities. It is known not as an object but as an instrument of 
activity. A person pours htmself into an instrument or dwells 
within an instrument to achieve some purpose or objective. In 
the same way a person dwells within his own body to achieve his 
bodily purposes and objectives. This notion of indwelling can 
then be extended to all instances of subsidiary knowledge. When 
one moves from knowledge of parts in themselves, to the know-
ledge of them as contributing to a whole, he can be said to 
"interiorize" or dwell within these particulars in comprehending 
the whole. '~he act of comprehending a whole i8 an interioriza-
tion of its parts, which makes us dwell in them in a way that is 
logically similar to the way we dwell in our body~"l 
Knowledge--practical and theoretical: 
It is now possible to briefly scan some different levels 0 
knowledge to see the structure of comprehension at work in them. 
From the beginning, Polanyi refuses to separate skilful doing 
IMichael Polanyi, "Science and Religion: Separate Dimen-
sions or Common Ground?," mimeographed for private circulation 
only. 
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(practical knowledge) from theoretical knowing. They ~omplement 
each other in most areas of knowledge, and they share the simi-
lar structure of comprehension. 
Skill is a performance, achieved by the observance of a 
set of rules which are not known as such to the person following 
them. The swimmer or cyclist has mastered his skill, and in 
performing it he coordinates a number of muscular and perceptual 
activities in a very regulated way, without in the least being 
able to specify the activities or the rules by which he works. 
S~i1arly the pianist performs a highly complicated skill. 
While focusing his attention upon the music, he is only subsidi-
arily aware of his fingers; yet, he is exercising perfect con-
trol over them. If he should change the focus of attention from 
the music to his fingers, in an attempt to substitute a focal 
control for subsidiary control, he would make mistakes and his 
performance would break down. Likewise, the conductor of an 
orchestra does not concentrate upon the individual movements of 
his body, but rather On the task at hand. He is only subsidi-
arily aware of his own movements. 
Very often skills are performed with tools. Consider the 
example of a golfer. He concentrates his attention upon the 
ball. His whole effort is to hit the ball well. He is only 
11 
his attention from the ball to the club he would proba7Jly miss 
the ball entirely. The same dilemma appears in tennis. One 
must concentrate on hitting the ball cleanly, and let a subsidi-
ary awareness control the racket. 
It is obvious that the subsidiary awareness which one has 
of a tool used in a skilful performance, is very much akin to 
the awareness of his own body. Of course a tool can be focused 
upon in itself, but when it is taken precisely as a tool it be-
comes an extension of the body. A tool can be clearly seen as 
an extension of the body if one considers how the impacts in the 
hand can be displaced and felt to take place at the outer 
reaches of the tool itself: 
Think of the use of tools.. In hammering in a nail we at-
tend to the hammer as it hits the nail, but we do so of 
course by being aware of the way the handle of the hammer 
impinges on our palm. The rower is aware of the strain in 
his hands and arms only in terms of the blades tearing the 
water. The blind man groping his way by means of a stick 
is aware of its impact on his palm in terms of the way the 
outer end of the stick hits on objects in front of him. 
When using a probe the surgeon feels the point at which it 
tip touches the walls of a cavity he is exploring. In all 
these cases, the thing to which we are attending is situ-
ated at some distance from the things yo the awareness of 
which we rely for attending to them ••• 
--------_._--------- -~ .,. ._-- ---
1m.chael Polanyi, "History and Hope: An Analysis of Our 
Age," Lectures delivered at the Thomas Jefferson Center for 
Studies in Political Economy, University of Virginia, 1961. 
Mimeographed for private circulation only, 32-33. 
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If tools then are assimilated as an extension of the body, 
one can be said to "interiorize" or "dwell within" a tool while 
performing a skill. T'be tool along with the body is known sub-
sidiarily, while attention 1s focused on the purpose of the 
skill. This is why the carpenter cannot explicitate all that 
goes into his skill, no~ can the apprentice learn carpentry by 
reading a book. 
The act of perception itself, which is fundamental both 
in skilful performances and in higher scientific areas, is a 
comprehensive achievement. The one doing the perceiving, sub-
ordinates a number of perceptual clues, known subsidiarily, to 
a focus. There are many subsidiary particulars which contribute 
to any act of perception: 
••• all these things which go on inside our eyes and other 
parts of our body in the process of seeing an object, and 
the memories which enter into our seeing from the back of 
our minds, as well as the remote bits of the visual field 
from the corner of our eyes, are things on our awareness 
of which we rely for seeing an object in a particular way. 
In this sense we undoubtedly know these thing! but we have 
little or no knowledge of them in themselves. 
Perception and skill are both an important part of science 
An expert who can identify 800,000 species of insects, relies on 
a highly trained power of perception. He obviously knows many 
IMichael Polanyi, ItFaith and Reason,tf Journal of Religion, 
41 (October, 1961), 237-247. 
13 
things subsidiarily which he could not explicitate. He could of 
course explain much, but much would have to remain unsaid.. This 
is why zoology and botany cannot simply be learned from books, 
any more than medicine. Many hours of practical laboratory work, 
under a teacher, must be given to these and other branches of 
the natural sciences. Skill in perceiving and testing must be 
acquired, and a person must become aware of a multitude of clues 
and particulars that cannot be exhaustively identified: 
••• testing has itself to be learned along with the art of 
recognizing the physiognomies of the tested objects. We 
must jointly learn to be skilful testers as well as expert 
knowers. Actually these are only two different and in-
separable processes of comprehension. Expert knowing 
relies on a comprehension of clues, while skilful examina-
tion relies on a combination of dexterous motions for 
tracing these clues. l 
Besides skill and perception, there is a purely theoret-
ical aspect of knowledge which might not at first seem to share 
the structure of comprehension. Theoretical science involves 
working with a symbolic system of some type, whether mathemati-
calor linguistic. Polanyi contends that man's use of a symbo-
lic system has the same structure as the other levels of know-
ledge explored thus far. A word or mathematical symbol or 
musical notation can be observed in itself, as a mark on paper 
lMichael Polany1, "The Terry Lectures," Yale University, 
1962. M1me aphed for private circulation with additions. 
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or a sound in the air, an entity of its own. However, to observe 
it in this way is to make it linguistically or mathematically or 
musically meaningless. This destruction of meaning is similar to 
the confusion which arises if the pianist focuses upon the move-
ment of his hands or if the carpenter focuses upon the hammer in 
his hand. One does not "observe" a symbolic statement, one 
"reads" it. To read he must assimilate the symbolic notation sub-
sidiarily. interiorizing it and dwelling within it, in an effort 
to "comprehend tt its meaning. Attention is focused on meaning 
while individual symbols are known subsidiarily. Thus a symbolic 
system or statement resembles a tool in that it can be interior-
ized and can become an extension of the body. Thus Polanyi says 
of Scientific theory: 
To rely on a theory for understanding nature is to interior-
ize it. For we are attending from the theory to things seen 
in its light and are aware of the theory, while thus using 
it, in terms of the spectacle that it serves to explain. 
This is why mathematical theory can be learned only by 
practising its application: Its true knowledge lies in our 
ability to use it. 
Finally, this consideration turns to the level of inter-
personal knowledge, which can include all the levels discussed 
up to this point. Generally, it can be said that one person comes 
to know snother person's mind or intent by observing his actions 
IPolanyi, "Terry Lectures," Lecture I, 14. 
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or through direct communication. The question at issue is whether 
inter-personal knowledge and communication shar~ th~ structure of 
comprehension that has been characteristic of other levels. 
Consider the case when one man comes to understand the 
skilful per£~nc~ of another man. As he watches the other man, 
he must try to combine mentally the performances which the other 
is combining physically_ By mentally dwelling within the particu-
lars of the performance, he observes the same pattern which the 
perfot'Dl'ar is trying to produce. Two kinds of indwelling meet 
here. The performer coordinates his moves by dwelling in them 
physically as parts of his own body, while the observer tries to 
coordinate them from outside, by,interiorizing them and dwelling 
within them as extensions of ~ body. By such exploratory in-
dwelling a student or apprentice may learn a master's skill.l 
In a similar way, chess players may replay games their 
master played to see what was in his mind. Students read books 
or study paintings in an effort to read a master's mind. These 
efforts are efforts at interiorization, efforts to dwell within 
these particulars in the same way the master dwelt within them 
in creating them. This analysis can easily be extended to explai~ 
direct communication. In listening to another person speak, one 
lIbid. Lecture II, 1-2. 
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attempts to interiorize the particulars of his speech according to 
the same focal meaning which the speaker has. The particulars are 
not just words, but tone and gesture as well. The same combina-
tion of words may be susceptible of different m~anings, that is 
different focuses. If the one listening interiorizes the words 
or any other particulars in a manner different from the interiori 
zation of the speaker he has misunderstood. The interiorization 
may make perfect sense, but he has failed to understand the mind 
of the other person. In all these cases of inter-personal know-
ledge, the particulars are knO\fl\ subsidiarily in termw of a focal 
meaning~ T\~o acts of compreh~nsion are involved, that of the 
sp~aker and that of the l.istener. 1 
~}'lsi.!.!._£o!..s~ruc~iye and Destrueti.!.!: 
Mention has been made all along of the unspecifiability of 
subsidiarily known particulars. It is now time to look more 
closely at this phenomenon and to examine its implications in the 
area of analysis. Analysis has always been a favorite method for 
improvement of skills aDd knowledge at all levels. A young boy 
~~f!~_,E~'3 _~'!!!!~.~ . ~(L'p5!~P:.t.._~.flaws_._~n h.is bat.ting, ~t~.!!£~~d 
lThe "intuitive" elemeDt in all levels of knowledge, es-
pecially noticeable on the inter-personal level, is ~xplained by 
the unspecifiability of subsidiary knowing, which is involved to 
a greater or lesser extent in all cowprehensi\lu. 
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tries to correct them by concentrating attent1.on on individual 
points such as bi.s fee.t or hands or the angle of his bat. An 
aspiring young actor spends hours practising his gestures before 
a mirror. A coach liill take movies to try to discover and correct 
individual fla't-ls in his team's performance. A student of poetry 
tries to enhance apprac1.ation and understa.nding by a careful 
verse-by-verse and word-by-word dissection of the text. A lin-
guist attempts to narrow in on the meaning of words by compiling 
long lists of various types of usage.. A scientist checks and re-
checks the smallest details of his experiments. And the list goes 
on. Every area of knowledge uses analysis as part of its method-
ology. 
The basic difficulty that analysis faces is in trying to 
transform a subsidiary knowledge of particular. and a tacit inte-
gration of them into a focal and explicit knowledge. Since sub-
sidiarily-known particulars exist at different levels of con-
sciousness. samet although subsidiary, are rather eas11y d1scern-
ible while others are ~possible to specify. Even those particu-
lars that are discernible may have their meaning destroyed or 
distorted by focuslng upon them in analysis: 
Usually it 1s not impossible to identify some particulars 
of a comprehensive entity, for example some symptoms of a 
clinically disanosad disease. But in such cases another 
limitation of specifiability becomes apparent, as Gestalt-
18 
phychology has amply taught us. Specifiabllity remains in-
cornpl l3ti"! in t\lO ,\Yays. Fir.at, thi'~re is ahmys a r': sic'..le of 
particulars left unspecified; and second, even when partic-
ulars CRn h~ idcl1ti::ied, isolation ch.lnges their app,:;ar.ance 
to some extent. 1 
Consider the example of language. Language grows up in a context 
of use. Through analysis and explicitation correct usage is 
spelled out in definitions and grammatical rules. However defini-
tion is never complete and grammatical rules are subject to fur-
ther and further qualification. Such an analysis is a specifying 
of particulars which are subsidiarily known in usage. Usage also 
knOW$ D1Ch more of language that cannot be specified. Definitions 
and grammar are only helpful to the person who knows the lang~~ge. 
They can help him develop his knowledge; but they can never rc-
place the subsidiary knowing of an infinity of particulars and the 
tacit integration of them that takes place in daily usage. 2 
Polanyi sees growth in knowledge as a dual movement, from 
comprehension to a specification of particulars in analysis and 
then reintegration into a compreh~nsive knowledge of the 1A1f101e: 
As a rule the two kinds of knowing do not completely ex-
tinguish each other. We may successfully analyze the 
symptoms of a disease and concentrate our attention on 
l~u.chael Polanyi, "Knowing and Being," Minds vol. LXX, 
No. 280 (October, 1961), 458-470. 
2polanyi's theory of language will be explained more fully 
in Chapter II. 
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its several particulars, and then we may return to our 
conception of its general appearance by becoming once more 
subsidiarily aware of these particulars as contributing to 
the total picture of the disease. Indeed, such an oscil-
lation of detailing and integrating is the royal road f01 
deepening our understanding of any comprehensive entity. 
The first part of this dual movement, analysis, is open to 
grave risks. An unbridled lucidity can destroy understanding of 
complex matters. In biological sciences one can lose sight of a 
pattern or physiognomy by examining its parts under great magnifi 
cation. 2 In other cases particularization can be irremediably 
damaging. Meticulous detailing can obscure subjects like history, 
literature, or philosophy beyond recall. 3 Even when analysis is 
done properly and leads to deeper understanding. it must be re-
integrated into a comprehension of the whole if it is to be 
fruitful. 
Thus the end is similar to the beginning. The fundamental 
structure of knowledge is comprehension. Even valid analysis 
leads back to comprehension, where particulars are known sub-
sidiarily and integrated tacit~y in terms of a focal meaning. 
Therefore, it is possible to restate the principle with which 
-------------_ ...... ,. -.. -----------------
lPolanyi, "Faith and Reason," 239-240. 
2polanyi, "Terry Lectures," Lecture I, 15. 
3Ibid• 15-16. 
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this chapter was begun, now with deeper understanding through 
analysis. "there are many things which men know but cannot put 
into words." 
II. LANGUAGE 
The vast superiority of human knowledge over animal intel-
ligence lies in man's ability to invent and use symbolic systems 
such as language. l The universe 1s known through comprehension, 
in which particulars are interiorized and tacitly integrated in 
terms of a focal meaning.. Man dwells within tbese particulars, 
as extensions of his own body, in comprehending thetr jOint mean-
ins. However, a man cannot assimilate a DlOUDtain as part of his 
mental life. A mountain is uDi1D8l1a8eable. In a suular way man 
cannot interiorize tiredness n as part of his mental life, for 
redness cannot be gotten hold of. There are red books and red 
drapes, but redoess itself cannot be isolated and in that sense 
it is unmanageable. However J if a mountain and redness are them-
selves unmanageable, the words ''mountain'' anduredness lf are easily 
interiorized and used as for comprehending the universe. Through 
the use of words, man is enabled to wderstand a reality which 
would otherwise be unmanageable. 2 Thus language is the tool by 
--------------------------------------_._-------------------
2Mic.hael Polanyi, "Words, Conceptions and Science, It The 
Twe~t~th C~.~~~l' September, 1955, p. 259. 
21 
22 
which man comprehends the universe; and by examining language in 
some detail it will be possible to see comprehension at work. 
The previous chapter examined the phenomenon of a man who 
could not say all that he understood. This chapter will take as 
its starting point the opposite phenomenon of one wilO cannot 
understand all that he has said. A child will easily fall into 
verbal puzzlement over a matter which he is quite capable of 
handling in practice. In this case, the child has became in-
volved in a linguistic fumbling which will later b~ corrected by 
fuller understanding. There is as well the case of the mathe-
matician working out mathematical conclusions which will later 
prove to have relevance and fruitfulness in the field of science. 
However, this scientific relevance and fruitfulness are, for the 
time being. hidden from him. Here the mathematician is involved 
in a linguistic pioneering which will be followed up by full 
understanding. Both instances, that of the child and that of the 
mathematician, point up the power of language to lead a man be-
yond his present ability to understand all that he is saying. 
The phenomenon of a man unable to understand all that he 
has said, brings out clearly the two fundamental aspects of 
language: 1) language as a formalized system, and 2) language as 
a tool for interpreting reality. As a formalized system it can 
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lead a man to conclusions beyond his present ability to under-
stand. Since it is also a tool for interpreting reality man 
faces the question as to whether his conclusions are a true 
revelation of reality or more sophistry.l 
Corresponding to the two aspects of language, Polanyi dis-
tinguishes two types of meaning -- existential meaning and de-
notative meaning. The more obvious kind of meaning is denotative 
in which one thing (a word) means another thing <an object). 
Other things like a tune or a pattern are more prnblematic, for 
while they are not meaningless, they have a meaning only in them-
selves. They do not stand for something else. This second type 
of meaning Polanyi calls existential. 
We may-describe the kind of meaning which a context pos-
sesses in itself a,s existential, to distinguish it espe-
cially from denotative or more generally, representative 
meanina. In this sense pure mathematics has an existen-
tial meaning~ while a mathematical theory in physics has a 
denotative meaning. The meaning of music is mainly exi.s-
tential, that of a portrait more or less representative, 
and so on. All kinds of order, whether contrived or 
natural, have existential meaning; but contrived order 
usually also conveys a message. 2 
Language, of course, has both kinds of meaning. As a formalized 
system it has existential meaning; while, as a denotative tool 
lpersonal Knowledge, pp. 94-95 • 
... '" t 10 __ 
2Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 58. 
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for interpreting reality it has denotative meaning. This dual 
quality of language is of prime importa.nce to Polanyi; therefore, 
this essay will treat each of these a.spects 1n same detail. 
LaIliuale, a Formalized System: 
Language is not created over night. Rather, it is the re-
sult of an intelligent effort over a long period of time. It 
arises within a culture, from the attempt of individuals to 
communicate with one another. It acquires richness as the people 
grow in depth of feelIng and thought. It becomes refined and 
precise as the culture becomes sophisticated. Words gather mean-
ing the way a floor gathers dirt, through continued use by many 
different people over a long period of time.. Some words are used 
by only a small number of people in very special circumstances, 
while others are used by all the members of the culture. Some 
words prove useful for a time and eventually die out J while others 
are preserved for centuries. Words are combined in certain pat-
terns. With time these patterns become somewhat regulated and 
are more or less precise. New patterns are added, some vanish, 
others remaJ.n. When a certain level of culture is reached, dic-
tionaries are written in an attempt to put down on paper the 
meanings that words have acquired. Grammars are written, explici-
tating the patterns of use in terms of linguistic rules. However, 
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dictionaries and grammars become out-dated aa usage changes; and 
inevitably new dictionaries and n~w grammars appear. And the 
process goes on in an unending stream. 
The evolution of language is slow and almost imperceptible. 
At a given moment in a culture's development, its language forms 
a systematic whole, fairly well defined by current dictionaries 
and grammars. The words and patterns of the language embody an 
interpretation of reality which incorporates the beliefs, the 
insights, and the values of earlier generations. 
Different languages are alternative conclusions arrived at 
by the secular gropings of different groups of people at 
different periods of history. They sustain alternative 
conceptual frameworks, interpreting all things that can be 
talked about in terms of somewhat different allegedly re-
current features. The confident use of the nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs, invented and endowed with meaning 
by a particular sequence of groping generations, expresses 
their particular theory of the nature of things. l 
A child, growing up in a culture and learning to speak its lao-
guage, takes on the way of thinking and the vision of reality 
which the language embodies. He gradually interiorizes it and 
dwells within it as an extension of his body. The language forms 
a framework through which he views the world. This framework 
breaks the world into various elements. The patterns of the 
language provide him with rules for reorganizing words, and 
IPolanyi, ''Words, Conceptions, and Science," p. 266. 
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thereby reorganizing the elements of the world, into new and 
different combinations. 
In its strict form, the conceptual reorganization of words 
according to logical patterns is known as deduction. This con-
ceptual reorganization takes language as a formalized system 
rather than a tool for interpreting reality. As one progresses 
away from ordinary language into more and more precise symbolic 
systems, there ar.ises a greater and greater emphasis on the for-
mal and systematic elements over the applicability of the system 
to experience. 
(1) the descriptive sciences, (2) the exact sciences, (3) 
the deductive sciences. It is a sequence of increasing 
formalization and symbolic manipulation, combined with 
cecreasins contact with experience. Higher degrees of 
fOrmB.lization make the statements of a science more pre-
cise, its inferences more impersonal ••• ; but every step 
towards this ideal is achieved by a progressive sacrifice 
of content. The ~nse wealth of living shapes governed 
by the descriptive sciences is narrOWed down to bare 
pointer-readings for the purpose of the exact sciences, 
and experience vanishes altogetherlfrom our direct sight 
as we pass on to pure mathematics. 
Pure mathematics then is almost totally a formalized SY8-
tem. The symbols of pure mathematics, like chessmen, do not 
necessarily stand for anything denoted by them in experience. 
Primarily, they stand for the use that can be made of them, 
IPolany1, Personal Knowledge, p. 86. 
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according to known rules. The mathematical symbol embodies the 
conception of its possible operations, just as a piece in chess 
embodies the conception of the moves which it may make. Thus 
pure mathematics lies almost entirely in the category of exis-
tential meaning as opposed to denotative meaning. 
The surprisingly varied terms in Which systems of algebra 
or geometry can be interpreted, demonstrate the tenuousness 
of their denotative functions. They do not refer to parti-
cular things and may be altogether empty categories, well 
defined, but applying to nothing. • •••• These self-contained 
systems of pure mathematics may tell us something which is 
important, without primarily refer~ing to anything outside 
themselves. 1 
It is now appropriate to ask whether the understanding and 
use of a formalized system involves comprehension. Polanyi would 
claim that it does. It is true that a logical deduction in mathe. 
matics is a formally articulated sat of steps which produces a 
conclusion totally implied in the premises. Moreover, these 
steps procede according to a set of rules which have been at 
least partially articulated. The truth of the deduction does not 
depend in any way upon anything which it denotes in experience, 
but simply on its internal consistency. Nonetheless, the under-
standing of a logical deduction has an informal, tacit and sub-
sidiary element and must be comprehended as a meaningful whole. 
To begin with, mathematical symbols, though they do not de-
lIbid. 
28 
note anything in experience, must still be interiorized and known 
subsidiarily. To look at a mathauatical symbol in itself, as a 
mark on paper, renders it meaningless. The meaning it has within 
mathematics, and therefore within any given deduction, must be 
known focally and comprehensively, while the symbol itself is 
known subsidiarily. 
Not only 1s the understanding of the meaning of mathemati-
cal symbols a comprebensive achievement; but more important, the 
grasping of a mathematical deduction is itself an act of compre-
hension, and thus tacit 1n character. A mathematical deduction 
may be articulated, but unless the proof is understood the arti-
culation is worthless. Certainly, no teacher would be satisfied 
with giving his students a chain of formulae connected by formal 
operations, and a student has not gained anything by learning 
such sequeuc~by rote. Unless the student has interiorized the 
articulated proof and grasped it as a comprehensive whole, he has 
not understood the deduction. 
To look at a mathematical proof by merely verify inc each 
consecutive step -- says Poincare -- is like watching a 
game of cbess, noting only that each step obeys the rules 
of chess. The least that is required is a grasp of the 
logical sequence as a purposeful procedure: what Poincare 
describes as "the something which constitutes the unity of 
the demonstrati.an .. 11 It is this :~something" -- perilaps in 
the forvt of an outline embodying the main steps in the 
proof -- for which the stude1lt will grope, if baffled by a 
sequence of operations which convey no sense to him, and it 
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is again this outline, embodying the general principle or 
general structure of the mathematical proof, which will 
be remembered when the details of the proof are forgotten. 1 
Thus, the individual articulated steps of a deduction are interi-
orized subsidiarily, while the main lines of the proof are a suc-
cession of tacitly integrated wholes, Which are themselves tacit-
ly integrated into the larger whole which is the entire deduction. 
The analysis of putemathematics has pointed up clearly the 
nature of a formalized system. It is characteristic of a for .. 
malized system to have existential meaning, and in a pure state 
such as mathematics it is devoid of denotative meaning. A for-
malized system is understood through a tacit and comprehensive 
grasp of its internal unity and consistency. 
When a formalized system is referred to experience an en-
tire1y new element is brought in. Now the system is given a 
denotative reference, over and above its existential meaning. 
This occurs for instance when mathematics is used in science. 
An attempt is made to tie mathematical symbolism down to certain 
elements of experience, and the fruitfulness of such an attempt 
is abundantly clear in the history of modern science. In 1&n-
guage there is an even greater reference to experience. Here one 
finds an immensely complex integration of these two aspects of 
lPo1anyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 118-119. 
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language often come into conflict, and no easy harmony can be 
established between them. The reason for this conflict will 
come clear in the following discussion which taltes up the appli-
cation of the formalized system of language to reality. 
Lang~e, a Tool for ~nte!pretin§ Re.a~it,.: 
The formalized system of a given language has grown up 
among a people trying to organize the world in which they live. 
People have named things and some of the names have remained and 
grown in meaning. They have cORte to use words according to cer-
tain patterns, and some of the patterns have caught on. Gradu-
ally the system was built up, not arbitrarily but by intelligent 
people trying to understand and express their common experience. 
At a given moment the system 1s a formalized whole. But to see 
it this way is an abstraction. lor a system of language is al-
ways in process J changing, developing. It has a threefold rela-
tion to experience. It relates to the experience of past gene-
rations who have formed the language and given it meaning (de-
notative and existential). It relates to present experience in 
that the people who use it look upon it as a true interpretation 
of reality_ And, very importantly, it relates to future experi-
ence. It promises to fit future experience into its categories 
and open up fruitful areas for future investigation. This 
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future reference of a linguistic system Polanyi calls its "power 
of anticipation." 
Moreover, by b<dng prepaI'ed to speak in our language on 
future occasions we anticipate its applicability to fu-
ture experiences, which tl1e expect to be identifiable in 
terms of the classes accredited by our language. These 
expectations form a theory of the universe which we keep 
testing continuously as we go on talking about things. So 
long as we feel that our language classifies things well 
we remain satisfied that it is right and we shall continue 
to accept the theory of the universe impli.ed 1n our ian·· 
guage as true. 1 
The future reference or power of anticipation which a 
linguistic system has is not unique. A similar power of antici-
pation can be found in less articulate activities of animals and 
men. Fo~ instance,perception gradually builds up a ha,bitual way 
of seeing things, a framework which divides reality into identi-
fiable objects. These perceptual categories not only apply to 
present experience, they also anticipate beiI~ able to structure 
future percoptions in a s~ilar way. Thus linguistic anticipa-
tian is akin to that of lower levels. 
The power of our conceptions lies in identifying new in-
s~ances of certain things that we know. This function of 
our conceptual framework is akin to that of our perceptive 
framework, which enables us to see ever new objects as 
such, and to that of our appetites, which enables us to 
reco8nize ever new things as satisfying to them. It ap-
pears likewise akin to the power o£ practical skills, over 
keyed up to meet new situations. We may comprise this 
lPolanyi, ''Words, Conceptions, and Science, U p. 258. 
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~~ole set of faculties, our conceptions and skills, our 
perceptual framework and our drives, in one comprehensive 
power of anticipation. l 
A linguistic syst~, with its power of anticipation, is 
not static. It is in process. If it anticipates being able to 
structure future experience, it does not anticipate doing this 
without itself being changed in the process. When a language is 
still young it interprets a narrow range of reality in a rather 
clumsy fashion. This is sat1.factory, for the peopleoaina it 
have not reached a level of sophistication to need a precise 
language. As a culture's experience widens with time its lan-
guase changes» takes on new meanings, aequires new words t uses 
old words more precisely and with greater depth of meaning. Thi. 
change is continual. Thus a l.inguistic system in meeting future 
experience will not 8imply bring this new experience under its 
old categories and patterns, but will also adapt its categorie • 
. and patterns to the newness of the experience. This adaptation 
and modification of the linguistic system as it meets new experi-
ences takes place on three levels: 1) in the life of the child 
learning to speak, 2) in science, and 3) in the everyday use of 
laagua,ge. 




fluttcril'tg in the td.lld and calla it ''weathe·c:.- U and hu calle tho 
clothespins usmall weathcrU and the windmill ftbig weather. n this 
clumsiness in his ltmgt::lgc t"efl':!ct:l a ::llt!utal confusion (Tiler tbe 
things he is talktng about.. His uac of language will be corrected 
simultaneously '11th his understanding of the difference between 
weather, 114Sb, windmills and clothesp1ns. This type of aropllli 
toward l1aguistie and mental clarity 18 not canf1ned to the chil4. 
Most 110'0 have a comparatively safe knowledge of a. certa1D uumbal'. 
of frequently Wlad words * ~er t this Q.UCll!U8 is aurrourad.ed by 
many half~understocd ~xpres.iona which they seldom use. As 1001 
as ODe does not have to use th4se worela. or can use ths 10 
situations which do not briDg out tbe confusion involved, there le 
ao stimulous to seek greater cla:ity.. However. with time. the 
child. who calls the wash "weather. U ami the man who is forced to 
use Wf-understood wor:t!a, will arope faa: p:eater clari.ty. In 
attaf.a1t!& this clutt,. t oW aDd confused concept1cma will be r .... 
pUcfo1d 11$ ~t' &ad clearer ODe.. Here, an :l.nd1vldual·. I1D&ula-
etc system 18 beiDa modified at the frinaes I where half-underat 
words are replaced by full, understood WOI'ds. Itt goina througb 
this process. one comes to 3J!'cater ccmpetence in the uae of a 
larger number of words, and at the same time 
clearer KDOWledge of reality. 
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A cultur(;: is much lil .. c a cbild in developing 1ts 1insuif:ltic 
system. It bC3ins by naming things rather awkwardly. When con-
fusion t'csuit.a from the use of some of its conceptions, it is 
forced to find better wordflj to clear up the confusion. This pro-
cess goes on continually as a culture strUigles to understand 
reality more fully, and from -this process emerges a caaplex and 
formalized linguistic system which expresses the character of the 
people and their interpretatiun of reality. 
2) The ty~e of modification of a linguistic system which 
goes on in science is very s~ilar to the above case of the child, 
a progression from confusion to clearer understanding through a 
clarification of terms. llowever, because of the sophisticated 
atmosphere in which it takes place. it is more impressive. Po lan-
yi cites the example of the atomic theory of chemistry, estab. 
lisb.eci by John Dalton in 1808 and generally accepted almost 1m,.. 
mediately. E'or the next fifty years, though all scientists used 
the theory, its meanins remained obscure: 
It came as a revelation to scientists when in 1858 Cannizaro 
distinguished precisely the three closely related concep-
tions of atomic wei&ht, molecular weight and equivalent 
weight (weight per valence), which had been us~d until Chen 
in an indeterminately interchangeable manner. The apposite-
ness of Cann1zaro's interpretative framework brought new 
clarity and coherence into our understanding of chemistry. 
Su;:h cl'lrification is irreversible; it is as difficult to 
reconstruct today the confused conceptions which chemists 
used durina the previOUS half century (and which for example 
induced Dalton to reject AvolgadrO' s Law as contr~~y to the 
atomic theory of chemistry), as it is to be baffled o~e 
more by a puzzle after having discovered ita solution. 
Here again one observes a very precise and sophisticated linguis-
tic system changing and being modified by the intelliaent men who 
are attempting to mold it into a better and better tool for inter-
preting reality. 
3) Language is constantly being modified in ita everyday 
use, Apart from the spur of a particularly acute problem, as it 1s 
applied to an ever new and slightly different set of experiences. 
This type of gradual and imperceptible modification takes place 
both in ordinary life al1d in science. Every new occasion on which 
a word is used 1s slightly different from any previous occasion. 
The ~ntire meaning which the word has acquired through past use 
is brought to bear on this Dew situation. However, the very new-
ness of: the sltuation demands that thewrd be slightly modified 
to fj,t the situation. uIn this cha.nging world, our anticipatory 
powers have always to deal with a somewhat unprecedented s1tua-
tiOll , and they can do so ill at-'maral only by undergoing some meas ... 
') 
ure of adaptation. H ... 
The necessity of continually adapting a lingui$tic system 
in bringing it to bear on an ever new reality is, of course. proh-
lPolanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 107. 
2Po1anyi, Personal Knowle3ii. 110. 
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lemat1c. If one appl1es tl» word "owl" to an uaprecedented owl, 
'Wiut makes th1.3 more true thl1t1 calling the bird a sparrow. and 
adapting ~'a linguistic system to include this bird as an ex-
ample of "sparrow"? In otbar ,,1Ot:ds, is not the modification of a 
linguistic system to fit an ever new real1ty an arbitrary thins? 
Po14n),1 would cla1m, within limits. that this nlOd.lfic.ation 
1s a utter of truth and fJl."ror.. If a culture modtf1es its lan-
Buage to fit an ever wider realit1r more adequately, its language 
IrOlf'S lnto a truer theory of the unlveraa. This car, be 11lus-
trated in the example of tho owl and the 8par'i~0'W': t'Tbus we call a 
Dew ktnd of owl an owl» rather than a spa.rr~;, because the UIOdlfl-
cation of the eoneepeion of owls by which wa l.nclude tho bird 1ft 
question as an 1aultcce af owls IIl.akos sanae; wf.la a modtf1catloa 
of our conception of aparrOffls J by \mlcb we would 1nclude thia 
btrd as an instance of sparrO"'Jls. maltss l'lODS.m1Se .. n 1 The decision 
to call an unprecedented bird an owl ratilert' than a Spa1.'"l.'OW 18 a 
tacit decision, by which ODe modifies his la\'\SU4ie, _d a dee1s1OD 
wh1eh involves trt.,cth and error. Because men realize that truth 
haass in the balance t they will often argue long a.nd bitter11 
about the "use of words. 





discovered heavy hydrogen (deuteritnn), and described it as a new 
"isotope" of hydrogen. In 1934, at a discussion held by the Royal 
Society, Frederic Soddy who had discovered isotopy, objected to 
Orey' s use of the 't'l7ord "isotope. II Soddy had orig1nally defined 
the isotopes of an element 4S chemically inseparable from each 
other, and heavy hydrogen was chemically separable from light 
hydrogen. Soddy's prot~st was ignored and a new meaning of the 
term "isotop~u was tacitly accepted. 
The new meaning allowed h~avy hydrogen to be included amana 
the isotopes of hydrogen: in spite of its unprecedented 
property of being chemically separable from its fellow iso-
topes. Thus the stat8llent "There exists an e1emettt deute-
rium which is aft lsotoDI'" of hydrogentt uss accepted in a 
sense which re.def1'ned the term isotope, so that this state-
ment. which otherwise 'fOUld be false, became true. The new 
conception abandoned a previously accepted criterion of iso-
topy as superficial, and relied instead only on the identity 
of mlclear charges f.n isotopes. 1 
In all three of the above areas a similar phenon~n~ is at 
work. Man possesses a formalized system of language, built up 
ove'J!' many years,. which must serve him as a tool for interpreting 
reality. In applying this language to an ever new experience, he 
not only comes to understand this experience. but he also con-
tinues to modify his language, changing the system which has been 
handed to him by past generations and building it into an ever 
lPolanyl, Pe:r:sonal KnO'l:Yl.ed;e, p. 111. 
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more adequate tool for understanding the universe. 
Polanyi cla1mB that this adaptation of language is a tacit 
and subsidiary achievement, which explains its often imperceptible 
character. As one learns language J he interiorizes its words and 
patterns and the various meanings and connotations which the 
idioms of the language can bring about. In a given Situation, al 
these elements J known subsidiarily, are integrated into a unique 
focal and comprehensive meaning as he tries to make sense of the 
situation in front of him and put this into words. In the process 
of making sense of the situation he adapts many of subsidiary ele-
ments of his language to include what is new in the present situa-
tion. The adaptation itself takes place subsidiarily, and the 
Whole process of understanding the situation and expressing it is 
a comprehensive achievement. 
The adaptation of our conceptions, and of the corresponding 
use of language to new things that we identify a8 new vari-
ants of known kinds of things, is achieved subsidiarily 
while our atteDtion is focused on making sense of a situa-
tion in front of us. So we do this in the same way in whic 
we keep modifying, subsidiarily, our interpretation of sen-
sory clues merely by striving for clear and coherent per-
ception, or enlarging our skills without focally knowing 
how, by practising them in ever new situations. The mean-
ing of speech thus keeps changing in the act of groping for 
words, without our being focally aware of the change, and 
our gropings invent words in tlrlJ manner with a fund of 
unspecifiable connotations. Languages are the product of 
man' s grapiDS for words in the process of making new con-
ceptual decisions, to be conveyed by words. 1 
TIlts treatment of language began with the phenomenon of 
1 
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a man unable to know all that he had said. It was claimed that 
the phenomenon was due to a verbal speculation which had led the 
man to conclusions which were linguistically consistent, but whose 
reference to reality was yet obscure. In the succeeding parts of 
the treatment, this split between linguistic consistency (existen-
tial meaning) and reference to experience (denotative meaning) was 
analyzed in terms of the dual aspect of language. Language is 
both a formalized system and a tool for interpreting reality, As 
a formalized system it has its own internal and existential mean-
ing, and can be used for verbal speculation. As a tool for inter. 
preting reality, the formalized system itself has a denotative 
reference, and if the denotative reference of a particular verbal 
speculation is obscure, then the above phenomenon can occur. 
Also, in applying a linguistic system to reality, the system is 
constantly modified to interpret an ever new reality more ade-
quately. Finally, comprehension is involved at all levels. 
Understanding the internal meaning and consistency of a linguis-
tic system is an act of comprehenSion, understanding the denota-
tive meaning of a linguistic system is an act of comprehenSion, 
and modifying the linguistic system to denote reality more pre-
cisely is an act of comprehension. 
Against the background of this analysis of language as a 
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cootprehens!ve ach1.~vement, '~olanyf tacklas a perennial problt:'m of 
philosophy, namely the problem of univers·itls. Th18 el141>ter will 
conclude '{d.th a dlsc1.'H,s1on of Polanyi '8 treatment of this topic. 
Univ~!rsals : 1----
In considering Polany1's treatment of univt!rsals, two main 
questions suggest themselves: 1) The logical difficulty of uniting 
a number of things ""bleb differ in every respect under a. a1.ngle 
conception or 4 Bingle word: 2) The reality or objectivity of the 
classifications desfanated by a universal term. 
1) Since the days of Plato men have wrestled .... ~th seeming 
contradiction involved in using the word ''manu to desi$DAte two 
men who ware different in every respect. This problem cannot be 
disca.rded by the claim that one unites two different men under a 
811181e term by designatio:; sane feature or aspect which the two 
hold in common. For the pl:'oblem can DOl" be restated 1n t"nn8 of 
this common aspnet. "How C411 one .efar to an a8p~et as • comntOn t , 
when ho is really uniting under a Single tem two aspects which 
d1.ffer :from one another in C!\tery respect. This problMD :f.s similar 
to that of empirical induct1on, where a 8 ins 18 law ie used to ex-
plain experiences whi.cb dUfer 10 every respect. Polany1 cla:l.m8 
that the difficulty involved here 1s that meD are searching 
for an .e!'Rlicl~ Eoce~~.! fett fOJ:'lll!D& classlflcati0D8 of objects 
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to be designated by a single term. Because universalizing and 
induction are tacit performances, it is ultimately impossible to 
obtain such an explicit procedure. 
In forming a universal, the individ~ls which differ from 
one another, are known subsidiarily and integrated tacitly in 
terms of their focal meaning. This focal meaning is expressed by 
a word, which thus becomes a universal term. Thus the formation 
of a universal ts an act of comprehension and involves tacit know-
iog. The tacit act by which one integrates the different individ-
uals can never be fully explicitated, as is true of all tacit ac-
tivity. This is why Polanyi denies the possibility of finding an 
explicit procedure. By his own acknowledgement of tacit knowledge 
he explainS the process of induction and avoids searching for an 
explicit justification of it. 
In forming a universal, one's tacit powers overcome an ap-
parent contradiction. Taking two things which differ in every 
respect, they integrate them by finding them identical in some 
other way. Polanyi tries to throw light on this type of integra-
I 
tion, by pointing to examples on the level of perception where 
tacit knowing integrates conflicting clues in various ways • 
• • • there is an :hnporta.nt case when conflicting visual clues 
are integrated to a true sight. we fuse the two different 
pictures of an object cast on the retina of our eyes by 
forming its stereoscopic image. Here perception resolves a 
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contradiction by revealing a joint ~anit! of conflicting 
clues in terms of a .!!!! gualitl. A simi r synthesis is 
achieved when we hear a sound as coming from a definite 
direction by combining its impacts that reach first one ear 
and then the other. This is also what happens in the forma 
tion of a general conception. l 
Hm~ever, there is an important difference between the per-
ceptual integration of conflicting clues and the integration of 
different objects under a general term. The difference lies in 
the curiously unsubstantial character of the joint meaning in the 
universalizing process. "Compared with ••• stereoscopic images, 
general conceptions are abstract, featureless, the focus in terms 
of which we are aware of the members of a class appears vague and 
almost empty.tt2 
Polanyi is not too explicit on the significance of this 
empty, or vague, or abstract quality of the universal. However, 
he tries to throw some light on the problem, through the example 
of coming to know a human being. One penetrates gradually to 
ever deeper levels of reality which are correspondingly less 
tangible. One first recognizes a man, then discovers what he is 
doing, then interprets his motives, and finally forms or reforms 
a conception of his personality. He hints that the vagueness of 




a universal concept as opposed to a perceptual integration of 
conflicting clues is due to a deeper penetration of reality. 
" ••• as 't-le move to a deeper, morc cooprehcnslve, understa.nding of 
a human being, we tend to pass fran more tangible particulars to 
increasingly intangible entities: to entities which are partly 
for tMs reason more real ••• ,,1 
2) Besides the question of integrating different things 
under a single conception, Polanyi takes up the question of the 
character of the universal in relation to the class of entities 
it clafms to designate (i.e. in what sense can it cla~ to desig-
nate an objective class of real entities?). Two problems are of 
interest here: (a) the non-arbitrary character of man's classify-
ing things by general terms; (b) the tacit and changing nature 
of these classifications. 
(a) At first glance, there would seem to be an infinity of 
different possible ways to claSSify things. Certainly different 
cultures have classified things in different '\'lays. Is it not 
then entirely arbitrary whether one calls all blue birds by one 
name and all black birds by another, or cnli& .11 birds by a 
single name which can in turn be modified by the adjectives blue 
or black? Furthermore, does not this arbitrariness extend to al 
IPolanyi, "Tacit Knowing," 253. 
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possible classifications of things? 
Polanyi would place himself squarely against such u theory 
of language. As 't>1as pointed Qut curlier. language is formed by 
intelligent men striving to construct a true theory of the uni-
verse. Different cultures develop different languages, not be-
cause choice of language is purely arbitrary, but because dif-
ferent peoples have different tasks, different personalities, dif-
ferent historles, and different geographical settings. If differ-
ent cultures are to express themselves intelligently in language, 
the languages will necessarily be different. To suggest that the 
AnglO-Saxon peoples, with their own history and setting and per-
sonality could have just as well developed a Semitic language as 
the. one they actually developed is, for Polany!. a monstrous af-
front to the intelligence of man. 
On a more particular level, if men went about classifying 
things arbitrarily, they would produce an infinity of irrele-
vancies which would completely destroy the possibility of intel-
lectual growth. For instance, it is ordinarily irrelevant to 
classify words by their first letters unless one is compiling a 
dictionary or some similar reference list. It is almost entirely 
irrelevant to claSSify words according to their second or third 
letters. Stmilarly, it would be ridiculous to classify birds by 
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their number of feathers, even if such a thing WEre possible. 
Thus classifications are a matter of truth and error, or life an4 
death. l 
(b) The above stand puts Polanyi explicitly in the camp of 
the metaphyatcians. However, his ideas on the tacit and change-
able character of universal terms shows his leaning toward prag-
matist and existentialist attitudes. His pOSition can best be 
brought out by examining the "three levels of intentions" which he 
gives to universal terms. 
A universal tera refers first-af-all to a certain number of 
easily-identified, common features which are properties of the 
class of things named. These could be called surface properties. 
They will be~ssed in any definition of the thing classified, 
and will be known to anyone at all conversant with the class of 
things ia question. 
Secondly, the universal term refers to known but not readi-
ly specifiable properties which these entities share. Such 
properties are not completely specifiable because they are known 
tacitly and subsidiarily at levels of consciousness that are not 
easily penetrated. If a class has a large range of such tacitly 
known properties, it mll lend itself to deeper and deeper analy. 
-
IPolanyi, Personal bowlede, lU ... 114. 
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sis over 101"'..g periods of time. """Yords of great human significance 
accumulate through the centuries an unfathomable fund of subsidi-
a~ily k110wn connotations. which we can bring partly into focus by 
reflecting on the use of such words ••• lIenee the fruitfulness of a 
Socratic enquiry into the meaning of words like f justice I or 
'truth' or • courage , • etc. Hl Thus this second level of intentions 
explains why one's explicit knowledge of the meaning of a word caa 
grow. as he penetrates further into the particulars which he knows 
tacitly. 
However, since all analysis of tacit knowledge is incomplet~ 
this secon.d level of intentions also reveals the limits of def:f.ni-
tian. It is often pointed out that definition is an unending pro. 
cess, for one can go on to define the words used in the definition 
and this process can be repoated to infinity. Polanyi t s explana-
tion of the incomplete character of definition is compelling. 
Words are tools for- :interpreting reality. their meaning built up 
through usagQ. Definition is akin to analyzing the skilful use of 
a tool: 
It is the acme as if we studied the motions involved in 
us1.ns a baaner effectively with a view to improving our 
l~eriag. For this we must wield a hammer as efficiently 
as we can. even while watching our motions to discover the 
oost 'way of hammering. Similat:ly. we must use the 'ford 
lIbld. l1S. 
47 
"justice," and use it as correctly and thoughtfully as we 
can, while watching ourselves doing it, if we want to aaa-
lyse the conditions under which the word properly applies. 
We must look intently and discriminatingly through the term 
"justice" at justice itself, this being the proper ute of 
the term tfjustice, It the use which we want to define. 
And just as one can never completely explicitate all the subsidi-
arily known particulars which contribute to the skill of using a 
hammer, so it is impossible ever to completely define a word. 
The third level of intentions if formed by the indeterminate 
range of anticipations expressed by designating a class of things. 
Just as it was earlier noted that a linguistic system anticipates 
subsuming future experience into its framework, so a universal 
term anticipates many future manifestations of the class which it 
designates. However, it was also pointed out above that as a lin-
guistic framework was applied to future experience, the framework 
itself would be modified. The ease of the universal term is again 
Similar, for as more and more experiences are brought under a uni-
versal term, the term gathers new meaning and new connotations. 
Some of these newly observed properties will accrue at the first 
level of intentions, and will be easily recognized; while others 
will accrue at the second level and often will be imperceptible. 
Thus it becomes evident that a universal term is meant to 
designate a relevant, objective class of entities. However, with 
lIbid. 116. 
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time and the newness of experience, these terms gather meaning 
and change. The meaning which they gather can be penetrated more 
and more, but can never be exhaustively explicitated. As always 
with Polanyi, language is a comprehensive whole, where subsidiary 
particulars are integrated to a focal meaning, and explicit kno,.'I. 
ledge is complemented by what is known tacitly. 
III. PROBLEM SOLVING 
Solving problems and answering questions is a basic activity 
which shows up time and again 1.n human living and human knowing. 
The child is perplexed over "where babies come from." The student 
struggles far the answers to his math. The young husband worries 
how he will make ends meet. And as he grows older a man may even 
ponder over the existence of God or the meaning of life. In 
scientific circles, new problems constantly lead to new discov-
eries; while the student of science faces the task of discovering 
for himself what science has discovered through the years. As the 
first chapter of this work outlined human knowledge as comprohen-
sive in structure. and the second chapter saw that structure at 
work in language. now the present chapter will attempt to bring 
out the structure of comprehension in this fundamental activity 
of solving problems. 
All waking animals exhibit a purposive tension, a readiness 
to see and act and make sense of their situation. The organism 
constantly strives to adapt itself to its environment and to 
fulfill the needs it feels within that eWJironment. From this 
general striving of the organism there emerges the more specific 
process of solving problems. A person becomes perplexed with an 
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element of his environment, and this perplexity gives rise to a 
tension which will remain until the perplexity is resolved. This 
resolution of the perplexity comes when a new way of perceiving or 
acting is found which makes sense of the situation and produces 
satisfaction. Thus the process of solving problems can be divided 
into four stages: 1) the problem; 2) the heuristic effort moving 
toward a solution; 3) the moment of discovery; 4) the verification 
of the discovery. 
The Problem: 
It would be wrong to describe a problem as absence of know-
ledge, though it is true that a problem implies a certain absence 
of knowledge. There are myriads of things that a given person is 
ignorant of, yet not all of these things are a problem for him. 
Rather, a problem is a stage between ignorance and knowledge. It 
is a definite addition to knowledge in that the person has se-
lected a certain area of his·ignorance and grasped it as a gap in 
his knowledge. Furthermore, he has found this gap promising and 
he foresees bridging this gap with a solution to his problem. In 
fact, seeing a problem involves seeing the first vague outlines 
of the solution, it involves same conception of the solution. 
Thus a problem includes a unique balance of the known and the un-
known. Polanyi brings out the elements of the known-unknown in 
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some detail. 
Different types of problems will involve more or less clear 
conceptions of their solutions. The simplest type of problem is 
searching for an object that is lost. ~~en one looks for his 
fountain pen he knows exactly what he expects to find, though he 
does not know exactly where he will find it. He can describe the 
pen in exact detail and he may well be able to specify a region 
within which it will be found. In this case the person faced with 
the problem has a. fairly exact knowledge of v1bat he is seeking and 
how to go about finding it. Searching for a word to fit a cross-
word puzzle involves a less clear conception. One may know that 
the word has five letters and is much needed in jungle explora-
tion. These clues in themselves are somewhat vague, and beyond 
this vagueness it is not certain that the person involved has seen 
the word before. Moreover, once a suitable word is found it will 
remain to be seen whether it fits with the rest of the puzzle as 
the precise word intended. Thus different problems will give rise 
to different conceptions of their respective solutions, but every 
problem in some ~lay contains a conception of its solution .. 
This "pre-conception" of the solution to a problem becomes 
very important in the progress of science. The scientist cannot 
take up every problem that occurs to him. If he tried to, science 
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would soon become cluttered with an infinity of irrelevant de-
tails. Instead, he must attempt to assess the relative value of 
different problems and choose from among them those which will 
contribute more to the advancement of science. It 1s only because 
he has a pre-conception of the solution to the various problems 
that he can make such value judgments; and thes2 value judgments 
arc a fundamental instance of the scientist's "skill.1t ChooSing 
a promising scientific problem is an achievement similar to the 
connoisseur's ability to distinguish good wine fram poor wine. 
To form such estimates of the app=oximate feasibility of yet 
unknown prospective procedures, leading to unknown prospec-
tive result~~ is the day-to-day responsibility of anyone 
~ndertelting independent scientific or technical research. 
On such grounds as these he must even compare a number of 
different possible sUSS6stions and select from them for 
attack the most promiSing problem. Yet I believe that ex-
perience shows such a performance to be possible and that it 
can be relied upon to function with a conslde=able degree 
of reliability.l 
The problem, besides including a pre-conception of its solu-
tion, also postulates the existence of that solution. Just as 
appetites such as hunger postulate the existence of something 
that will satisfy them, so the intellectual desire that is at 
work in a problem postulates the existence of a satisfactory solu-
tion. Even thouSh the solution is something never before encOUD-
Ipolanyi, Personal Kn~~1edge, 124. 
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tered, still it is similar to the mislaid fountain pen which ex-
ists. One searches for a solution as if it were there, existing 
but hidden. Thus comparing real problems with the artificial 
problems givl~n to students, Polanyi makes the statement: "Proble 
set to students are of course known to have a solution; but the 
belief that there exists a hidden solution wl-Jicb we may be able 
find, is essential also in envisaging and working at a yet un-
solved prob1em."1 
The problem then contains both a pre-conception of its so-
lution and a promise of the existence of that anticipated solu-
tion. It remains to show how this pre-conception and promise-of-
existence fit tvithin the comprehensive structure of the problem. 
It was remarked earlier that seeing a problem is a real 
addition to knowledge. An existing set of facts become a prob-
lem when they begin to be seen as pointing to a unity beyond 
themselves. Up to this point they were seen as isolated facts; 
now they are no longer isolated facts, but clues which indicate 
a yet-unknown unification. This switch from being-seen-as-iso-
1atad-facts to being-sean-as-clues is a switch from focal to 
subsidiary knowing. Each of the facts ~re previously known 
lMichael Polanyi, IIProblem Solving," The British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science, VIII (August! 19~7)J 97. 
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focally, as entities in themselves. As they begin to be inte-
grated as subsidiary elements pointing toward a focus, the prob-
lem begins to come into view. The integration of course remains 
incomplete, and the focus remains unknown, until the problem is 
solved. 
This illustrates the most striking powers of tacit knowing, 
owing to which we can focus our attention on the joint mean 
ing of particulars, even when the focus to which we are at-
tending has DO tangible center. It represents our capacity 
to know a problea. A problem designates a gap within a 
constellation of clues pointing toward something unknown. l 
Thus a problem baa a comprehensive structure. A set of dat 
begin to be known subsidiarily as clues pointing toward an antici 
pated focus. The problem posits the existence of a solution by 
promising a focus in terms of which it will integrate the subsidi 
ary elements. The pre-conception of the solution is the collec-
tion of clues. This pre-conception is necessarily vague because 
the clues are known subsidiarily and the focus remains unknown. 
Finally, it becomes evident why only the scientist's "skill" can 
choose the valuable problem from the maze of possible problems. 
The problem must be assessed in terms of its pre-conception. 
This pre-conception is a collection of subsidiarily known clues. 
Therefore, the pre-conception cannot be adequately explicitated 
lPolanyi, "Tacit Knowing," 255. 
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and submitted to close analysis. If the value of the problem is 
to be assessed, this assessment will necessarily be a tacit and 
skilful achievement rather than explicit and critical. 
The Heuristic Effort: 
Along with a problem comes a tension or a desire to find the 
solution. This desire leads a man to ponder, to search, to exper-
iment in an effort to obtain a solution. A man faced with a prob-
lem may sit down at his desk and take out a pencil and paper. He 
will write for a while, sit back, pace the floor and after a rela-
tively short period of time the solution will come to him. An-
other man will live with his problem for weeks or years before 
hitting upon a solution. At times he will be quite conscious of 
it and concentrate on trying to find a solution, while at other 
times it will 11e at the very back of his mind, forgotten or near-
ly forgotten for the moment. The question of interest here is 
what goes on in the time lapse between the coming of the problem 
and the finding of the solution. To what extent does the man 
bring about the solution, and to what extent must he wait for it 1 
There are two types of problems admitting of two different 
approaches to solvingtbem, namely the systematic approach and 
the heuristic approach. Some problems may admit of a systematic 
solution. If sOInC!one knows his pen 1s somewhere in a given room, 
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it is possible to search the room inch by inch until it is found. 
If he literally searches every square inch of the room, he is surt 
to find the pen. Similarly, it is conceivable to solve a chess 
problem by trying out all possible moves and counter moves. 
However, most problems do not in practice admit of such system-
atic solutions, for the possibilities are far too numerous to 
permit individual systematic examination. 
The heuristic approach to solving a problem (which is of 
prtmAry interest here) consists of alternating active and pas-
sive stqes. The persOft involved begins by setting up the prob-
lem as well as he can, then he "waits attentively" for the bright 
idea. If nothing eomes he tries to set the problem in slightly 
different terms, then waits asain. At times he may feel himself 
approaching near a solution, while at other times he may feel 
that he has wandered up a blind alley. Thus the person does not 
set the problem up anew each time at random. Rather he tries to 
sense when ~~ ~~ moving toward the solution and when he is moving 
away from it. It is this sense of the approaching solution whicb 
enables him to cboose, from a myriad of possible ways of setting 
up the problem, those operations which will lead htm to the solu-
tion. 
I believe that we should ••• acknowledge our capacity both tc 
sense the accessibility of a hidden inference fram given 
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premisses and to invent transformations of the premisses 
which increase the accessibility of the hidden inference. 
l-le should recognize that this forknowl~dge bias.;as our 
guesses in the right direction, so that their probability 
of hitting the mark, which would otherwise be zero, becomes 
so high that we can definitely rely on it simply on the 
grounds of a student's intelligence; or for higher per-
formances, on the grounds of the special gifts possessed 
by the professional ••• l 
Thus the ability to sense the nearness of a solution and to sense 
the operations that will lead nearer the solution are attributed 
to the skill of the one attempting to solve the problem. It is 
stmilar to the cook's ability to know just what is still aeeded 
to make the soup taste perfect. 
The active stages of the heuristic effort tben consist of 
operations upon the problem which bring one nearer and nearer to 
its solution. But what happens during the passive stages, when 
one "waits attentively"? There is no activity going on in full 
light of consciousness; however, there may well be activity goi 
on at subconscious levels. Besides this there is a more or less 
intense concentration upon the problem, a tension and a striving 
which reaches out for the solution. 
Often the solution to a problem will come at the oddest 
moments.. After thinking about it at sOI.1le lensth, one may put 
the problem aside for awhile and take up same other activity. 
lPolanyi, "Problem Solving," 99-100. 
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Often enough it is during such a period of rest that the answer 
will suddenly come. The only possible explanation for such a 
phenomenon is that the integrating activity, in some form or 
other, has continued at sub-conscious levels even after the 
problem has been put aside. 
However, there are passive moments even while one is 
intensely preoccupied with trying to solve the problea. These 
are moments of concentration. There are no conscious operations 
being performed, yet somehow during these moments the solution 
c~es closer, or perhaps leaps into view. Whatever activity 
takes place, bUtes place at sub-conscious levels. On the con-
scious level there is only attention. But attention to what? 
It must be said that what is attended to in these moments is the 
solution itself, the unknown answer, the empty focus, the yet-to 
be-grasped.integration. These are what a person concentrates on 
as he waits for the solution. 
But ,,:-!1~t is the object of this intensive preoccupation? 
Can we concentrate our attention on something we don't 
know: Yet this is precisely what 't'iC are told to do: "look 
at the unknown! ft says Poly., "Look at the end. Remember 
your aim. Do not lose sight of what is required. Keep in 
mind what you are working for. Look at the unknown. Look 
at the conclusion." No advice could be more emphatic. 1 
The heuristic approach to • ..,lving problems then is an io-
IPolany1, "Problem Solving," 98. 
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telligent (though non-systematic) striving toward an integration 
of particulars in terms of a yet-unknown focus. The striving is 
comprehensive in structure in that it is a striving for campre-
hension. It is an effort to grasp the particulars subsidiarily 
rather than focally, to grasp them not as facts but as clues to 
the desired insight. The more successful one is in grasping 
these particulars as clues the more they will point htm toward 
the solution. There are moments of subconscious activity be-
cause there are moments when all activity is at a subsidiary 
level far below the point of focus. Furthermore, the ability to 
sense the nearness of a solution and to invent operations which 
will bring the solution nearer is a matter of "Skill, It for it 
deals with subsidiary elements many of which cannot be singled 
out explicitly. Finally, the center of concentration is the 
yet-unknown focus of integration, for in concentrating on this 
empty focus one is able to grasp the various particulars sub-
sidiarily as clues to insight which is yet to come • 
••• even though we have never met the solution we have a 
conception of it in the same sense as we have a conception 
of a forgotten name. By directing our attention on a 
focus in which we are subsidiarily aware of all the 
particulars that remind us of the forgotten name J we form 
a conception of it; and likewise, by fixing our attention 
on a focus in which we are subsidiarily aware of the data 
by which the solution of a problem is determined, we form 
a conception of this solution. The admoaition to look at 
the unknown really means that we should look at the known 
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data, not,however, in themselves, but as clues to the 
'ii'iikiiown:as ~ointersto it and t!ar"tSoTit. Wes'bou{d 
make every-e fort to 1eer-our-way to an understanding of 
the manner in which these known particulars hang together 
both mutually and with the unknown. Thus we make sure 
that the unknown is really there, essentially determined 
by what Is known about it, and able to satisfy all the 
demands made on it by the problem. l 
Discovery: 
A problem is seen. A heuristic effort is begun. Then 
sooner or later, expected or unexpected, discovery comes. There 
is the joyful release from the tension which accompanied the 
problem. Understanding has replaced puzzlement, and the mind 
has achieved a new vision of reality. What precisely is the 
nature o~ this moment of discover)'? How does this act of the 
mind differ from others? 
Once a person has solved a problem, he will never again 
be puzzled by it in the same way_ Faced with the same or simi-
lar circumstances he will easily grasp their meaning. There 
will be no problem, no tension, no heuristic effort, no agonize 
waiting, no joy of discovery in understanding the circumstances 
involved. In this sense discovery is quite different from any 
systematic activity, such as adding a col\~n of figures or 
tabulating items on a grocery counter. Such systematic activi-
lIbido 
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ties can be performed deliberately according to an explicit set 
of rules. The second and third performances of a systematic act~ 
vity are not significantly different from the first. They re-
quire the same amount of effort, the same concentration, the same 
t~e, and they produce the same results and the same minor satia. 
faction. In this sense Polanyi speaks of systematic activity as 
reversible and discovery as irreversible. A systematic activity 
can be traced back to its beginnings and performed again, and 
there is no significant difference in the acts performed. Dis-
covery cannot be traced back to its beginnings, for it began in 
puzzlement which cannot be reproduced, and it proceeded by an un-
specifiable heuristic effort, not by systematic steps which can 
be reproduced at will. 
This irreversible character of heuristic acts is tmportant. 
It suggests that no solution of a problem can be accredited 
as a discovery if it is achieved by a procedure foll~iing 
definite rules. For such a procedure would be reversible 
in the sense that it could be traced back stepwise to its 
beginning and repeated once more any number of tDmes, like 
any arithmetical computation. Accordingly, any strictly 
formalized procedure would also be excluded as a means 
of achieving discovery.l 
Discovery is unique among mental activities in that ic 1n-
volves the attainment of a new view of reality, or at least a new 
view of some aspect of reality. The new idea is one which was iQ 
lIbid. 92-93. 
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no way implied in previously known ideas. Thus Polanyi speaks of 
discovery as crossing a. Hlogical gap. H The logic of the old wa.y 
of looking at things was inca.pable of arrlvlna a.t the discovery. 
Rather the discovery brings with it a new way of looking at 
things, with its own logic. 
Established rules of inference offer public paths lor 
drawins intell1&ent conclusiooa from existing knowledge. 
The pioneer mind wilich reaches its own distinctive con-
clusions by crossina a logical gap deviates from the com-
monly accepted process of reasoning, to achieve surprising 
results. Sucb an act is or1g1nal in the sense of maklng 
a new start, and the capacity for initiat:1n~ it is the glft 
of or1g1nality, a gift possessed by a small minority.l 
The bridging of a logical gap comes out clearly in the dis-
covery of an inventor. An iavention 1s not sf.mply something new. 
There aro new cars and new models of appliances coming out each 
year. Tbey are sl1ghtly different. perhaps significantly dif-
.ferent from old models; but they are not inventions. for they do 
not represent an entirely new idea, a new way of think1ng which 
was 110t implied in the old way of tMnkins. An invention 1s 
something new and or:l.ainal. The inventor bas achieved something 
that could not have been predicted. It is a creation of his 
intelligence. Tberefore, it belongs to 111m :tn a special way_ A 
new model of a ear is an improvement on older models, but it is 
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not entirely the product of the designer's intelligence in the 
sense that an invention is. When the law recognizes that some-
thing is an invention, that an individual has produced this thing 
himself, it considers the invention as belonging to that individ-
ual and recognizes this ot~ership in the form of a patent. 
The ~vidth of the logical gap crossed by an inventor is sub ... 
ject to legal assessment. Courts of law are called upon to 
decide ~mether the ingenuity displayed in a suggested tech-
nical improvement is high enough to warrant its legal 
recognition as an invention, or is merely a routine im-
provement, achieved by the application of known rules of 
the art. The invention must be acknm~ledged to be. unpre-
dictable, a quality which is assessed by the intensity of 
the surprise it might reasonably have aroused. This unex-
pectedness corresponds preCisely to the presence of a 
logical gap between the antecedent knowledge from which the 
inventor started and the consequent discovery at which he 
arrived. l 
Great discoveries are the work of genius and ordina117 dis-
coveries are the work of intelligent men, but there are minor 
acts of discovery scattered all through the every-day life of 
ordinary people. Facing new situations and new problems, and 
adapting one's language to meet these new situations, are ex-
amples of such day-to-day discoveries: "Admittedly, there are 
minor heuristic acts within the power of ordinary intelligence 
and indeed continuous tdth the adaptive capacities of life d~~ 
to its lowest levels. The interpretative frame't>1ork of the 
lIbid. 
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educated mind is ever ready to meet somewhat novel exp~riences 
and to deal with them in a somewhat novel manner."l 
It remains to see discovery within the structure of com-
prehension. In the problem stage a number of elements began to 
be grasped subsidiarily as clues to a yet-unknown. The heuristic 
effort brought a gradual approach toward the solution, by inte-
grating these elements more and more toward a still-empty focus. 
Finally, in the moment of discovery, the integration is completed 
and the focus leaps into view for the first time. With this new 
integration a logical gap is crossed and a new vision of reality 
is achieved. The precis~ nature of the logical gap can perhaps 
be seen in the difference between subsidiary and focal knowledge. 
The various elements were known individually and focally prior to 
the rise of the problem. This focal knowledge of the individual 
elements could never have led systematically or logically to 
their integration as subsidiary elements of a new and original 
focus. Only the heuristic effort and the act of discovery, a 
, 
tacit and original achievement of intelligence, could cross such 
a logical gap, integrate the elements subsidiarily to a new focal 




The discovery emerges from the heuristic effort accompanied 
by the conviction that it is true. The problem itself, as was 
seen earlier, posited the existence of a solution and brought 
with it a pre-conception of that solution. During the heuristic 
effort the sOlution was brought closer and closer. Now, as that 
solution emerges, it emerges as an existing and true solution to 
the problem: "Therefore, as it emerges in response to our search 
for something we believe to be there, discovery, or supposed dis-
covery, will always came to us with the conviction of its being 
true.. It arrives accredited in advance by the heuristic craving 
which evoked it.ttl 
Thus the solution does not emerge in discovery as one pos-
sible hypothesis, one among a myriad of possibilities. Rather 
it emerges from the elements that were in-need-of-explanation and 
it emeries as the explanation of those elements. It comes as 
satisfying and as deserving acceptance, and the person who ex-
periences the discovery receives it as something to which he is 
committed. Thus something s~ilar to verification has already 
begun in seeing the problem, in the heuristic effort, and in the 
discovery. Strict verification will carry this process further, 
but it is not essentially different in nature from the processes 
lIbido 101. 
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which have been going on. It is basically rooted in the same 
"skill" which founds the ability to see a problem, sense the 
approach of a solution, and come up with a discovery. Similarly, 
because it is rooted in skill verification will be characterized 
by an element of unspecifiability and will be ultimately a tacit 
activity. 
Verification attempts to assess the bearing of a theory on 
experience. The more one finds his theory applicable to and 
capable of explaining experience, the more he becomes convinced 
of its truth. However, the bearing of a theory on reality is 
only partially specifiable. Much of the testing of a theory 
will be accomplished tacitly and subsidiarily, for many of the 
elements on which the theory bears can only be known subsidiari-
lye Verification will attempt to explicitate as many of these 
elements as possible, and then will go on to explicitate the 
theory's relation to these elements. However, there are limits 
to the possibilities of this explicit verification. Those ele-
ments which remain subsidiary, which have been tacitly integrated 
in terms of the theory as their focus, and which cannot be ade-
quately explicitated, these have a claim to truth, and thus to 
"verity," because they have been satisfactorily integrated by 
the skilful activity of intelligence. Thus verification is in-
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complete, and is rooted in a skilful and tacit activity which 
claims validity because it satisfies its own built in standards. 
A theory is "verified," but the skill in which it is rooted is 
only "validated" by continual satisfactory performance. 
In different areas of knowledge, there will be different 
combinations of verification and validation. Verification is 
most proper to strict science; while areas such as art, inter-
personal knowledge, and religion must be to a large extend vali-
dated. 
The acceptance of different kinds of articulate systems as 
mental dwelling places is arrived at by a process of grad-
ual appreciation, and all these acceptances depend to some 
extent on the content of relevant experiences; but the 
bearing of natural science on facts of experience is much 
more specific than that of mathematics, religion or the 
various arts. It is justifiable, therefore, to speak·of 
the verification of science by experience in a sense which 
would not apply to other articulate systems. The process 
by which other systems than science are tested and finally 
accepted may be called, by contrast, a process of valida-
tion. 
But everywhere, even in the strictest sciences, verification is 
rooted in validation. Verification is rooted in skill. The ex-
plicit 1s rooted in the tacit. And the whole is a comprehensive 
achievement. 
IPolanyi, Personal Knowledse, 202. 
IV. BELIEF 
Modern man is unprecedented; yet we must now go back to St. 
Augustine to restore the balance of our cognitive powers. 
In the fourth century A.D. St. Augustine brought the histor, 
of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first 
time a post-critical philosophy. He taught that all know-
ledge was a gift of grace, for which we must strive under 
the guidance of an~ec~der.t halief: nisi credideritis, non 
intelligitis. His doctrine ruled tli'iliiinds of ChrIstian 
scholars foi a thousand years. Then faith decoined and 
demonstrable knowledge gained superiority.l 
For Polanyi all knowledge is rooted in belief (though he is 
not speaking of a supernatural faith like Augustine's). Just as 
knowledge is not able to be fully explicitated, neither is it 
able to be fully demonstrated. There always exists an ultimate 
range of beliefs, rooted in one's own activity, language, and 
culture, which found the demonstration of individual acts of 
knowing_ These ultimate beliefs cannot themselves be demon-
strated, but are accepted as the objects of a personally held 
commitment. Thus the ultimate reason one must give for holding 
any piece of knowledge is "because I believe it to be so." 
Polanyi feels that an adequate philosophy must acknowledge ex-




goinl to avoid the danger of setting up a false ideal of know-
ledge. 
Positivism is the prime example of a philosophy which has 
refused to acknowledge tho fiduciary found4tions of all.knowing. 
As a result there was erected the ideal of a completely detached, 
impersonal, and scientific objectlvlty~ The desirable thing was 
to remove the subject as much as possible from knowledge, and tbus 
achieve universal validity through a machine. like objectivity. 
Positivism conceives science, the only valid form of lQlowledge, 
as based on completely demonstrable fact: 
The philosophy-to.end-all-philosophy may be designated, if 
somewhat loosely, 4S pOSitivism. It coatinued in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the rebellion against 
the authority of the Christian cburches first started in 
the days of Montaigne. Bacon aad Descartes. But the move-
ment set out not only to liberate reason from enslavement 
by authority, but also to dispose of all traditionally 
guld1n& ideas. 80 far as they are not demonstrable by 
science ••• In this light, justice, morality, custom and law 
appear as mere aets of conventions t eha.rged wf.th emotional. 
approval, which are the proper study of sociology. Con ... 
science 1s identified with the fear of breaking SOCially ap 
proved conventions, aud its Investlgatlon 1s assigned to 
peycholosy. Aeatheticvaluse are related to an equllibrlu. 
of opposed impulses 1n the rwrvOU$ system I)f the beholder. 1 
Unc!er the guidance of such concepts one is r:!ltpected to be-
come truly detached and objective 1n approachtna the whole world, 
including one's s~lf and the affairs of men. Polany1 upholds the 
IM1chael Polanri."Th. Nature of Scientific Coavictiona," 
14. 
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fiduciary foundations of all kno~~ng in opposition to this posi-
tivistic ideal of a completely demonstrable knowledge. The point 
of the present chapter will be to outline Polanyi's defense of be 
lief and see how belief fits into the comprehensive structure of 
knowing. 
Different Systems of Belief: 
There exist in the modern world a number of radically dif-
ferent systems or sets of belief. Po1anyi would associate him-
self with the set of beliefs embodied in the Western tradition 
and in modern science. From this vantage point he sees a number 
of other systems of belief which in many instances contradict his 
own. Examples of such conflicting beliefs are those of Marxism, 
astrology, or the beliefs of current prtmitives in witch-craft, 
sorcery. and oracles. For the purposes of this chapter it will be 
preferable to narrow the examination and investigate the contrast 
between the beliefs of modern science (with which Polany! associ-
ates h~self) and those of the Zande Indians in oracles. 
The Zan de submit questions to the oracle. then administer a 
substance called "benge" to a specially chosen bird. The "benge" 
is administered in prescribed doses and accQapanied by special 
incantations. By observing the condition of the bird. as it 
chances after being given the benge, the Zande are able to inter-
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pret the measase of the oracle. This whole ritual and the belief 
in its efficaciousness is embodied in the tradition of the ZaDde. 
This particular belief is part of a whole system of beliefs, and 
within that system bas an tmporeeptiblc eaanection and influence 
&mODI many other of their beliefs. All of these beliefs mutually 
support one another; and OV~ the years thG belief in the oracle, 
alons with their other beliefs, havQ (at least to the satisfac-
tion of the ZaDde) baen confirmed by experience. 
Modern science, of course, eaaily eliscovered that llbenge" 
is a natural POiaOll. ~ben administered tc a fowl in small dos.a 
it will perceptibly ch.a.n,ge his health, but usually will not kill 
him. Thus science believes the Zandc to be miltakon in their be-
lief in the oracle. FuX'tMrcaore, they can point to tests which 
will faulfy this belief by prov1n,g b~nge to be a natural poison. 
Such proof. however, does not interest the Zande. Polany1 gakaa 
refereuce to the findings of Evans-Pr1tcllard in examin1n6 the 
Zande belief in oracles: 
He often asked Azud.e what would happen if they were to 
adminlster oracle-polson (benge) to a fowl without deliver-
iOi an address, 01: if they were to administer an extra por-
tion of poiSon to a fowl whlch bas recovered frca the usual 
doses. The Zandc -- be says -- does not know wbat l.;ould 
happen and 1. not iDt.ere.ted in what would happen; DO one 
has been fool cnough to waste good oracle-polson in making 
such poiDtle.. exper!menta whicb 0111,. a Europe_ could 
1ma&1ne. Indeed, were a. European to make a test whicb in 
h1a view proved Zand.e o,loioo wrq they would stand __ ad 
72 
at the credulity of the European. If the fowl died they 
would stmply say that it was not good benge, the very fact 
of the fowl dying being proof of this. l 
This introduces the further point ~ not only is the Azallde 
uniterested in performing experiments which might falsify his be-
lief in the poison-oracle, but aetually no experiment could be 
performed which would convince him of the falseness of the 
oracle. Any experimental evidence, seen from the Zande point of 
view, CaD be either explained m~y or ignored as negligible and 
irrelevant. This deserves elaboration. 
Any objection to the Zande belief in the poison-oracle or 
any experimental evidence against it can be met one hy one. If 
a large dose of poison is administered to the bird and it dies, 
the zenda DUSt decide how to interpret this happening. If the 
Zande were facin! this situation without any preconceptions, COUl-
pletely detached from any view of the world or system of heliefs. 
they might well suspect that tbe benge was a natural poison. 
However, the individual case of the death of this bird is seen 
against the background of their wb~le tradition and cultural be-
lief in the oracle. This particular instance 1s seen in the con-
text of the thousand of past instances which have been inter. 
4tichael Polanyl,"The Stability of Beliefs,tt The British 
Journal for the Pbilosoph~ of Scienee, III (November, 1§525, 
220-221. 
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preted in terms of their belief. In such a context, this individ. 
ual instance can only be interpreted as a case of bad benge. The 
bird died, not because benge is a natural poison, but because the 
benge selected was not good benge. This instance is not seen as 
weakening belief in the oracle; rather, because the oracle is 
accepted as true and the beng~ accepted as an oracular substance 
,and not poison, the death of the bird "proves" that the benge was 
Ilot good bense. Not only would such an instance not weaken the 
Zande system of belief; but, on the contrary, by being interpreted 
in terms of that system it would constitute one more piece of 
evidence conf1rmin& the belief in the oracle. 
Not only does the force of the traditional belief have the 
power to outweigh any objections which can be considered one-by. 
one; but the Zande will have alternative secondary explanations 
for any instances which seem to fall outside their belief in the 
oracle. One example of this was interpreting the above instance 
as a ca.e of bad benge rather than interpreting benge as a natu-
ral poison. Other possible secondary explanations mi&ht be: "that 
the bird was sick before the betl8e was administered,ff or "tha.t the 
rites had not been properly perforn~d while administering the 
benge." Thus the Zande beliefs gradually grow into a well-knit 
and self-consistent system, more or less impregnable to the force 
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of evidence which would refute the system. Individuals livina 
within such a cultural framework have little chance of setting 
themselves free from this set of b~.~liefs. They are embodied 1n 
the language they speak and the interpretation of the world which 
has been taught them since childhood. Furthermore. from the time 
they be!in to think, they think from within their language and 
their culture and in communication with other men Who share their 
beliefs. Thus each day's thought and activity will serve to 
strengthen the "evidence" for these beliefs. 
The crucial question must now be faced: "how is this pheno-
menon of the Zande beliefs to be interpreted?" This is not to 
ask whether the belief in poison-oracles 1s true or false. Even 
1f this particular Zande belief is accepted as false, the ques-
tion remains whether the whole process by which the Zande built 
up a system of beliefs and interpreted new instances from within 
that system of beliefs is basically valid or invalid. Positivism 
would suggest that the Zande have been led into error becauss 
they were careless. A man must approach new evidence with an 
"open mind. tf He must not alloll his belief 11.1 a certain inter-
pretat1.OD of the ,;t1orld "bias" him against the import of new evi ... 
dence. Positivism would go on to claim that the success of 
science 18 precisely due to its ability to be "disinterested" 
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and "impersonal U in its approach to fact. Thus rather than 
"interpret fact 1n terms of its beliefs," it succeeds in udeDlOD_ 
strating" knowledge by observable "fact." Polany1 would, of 
course, disagree with this positivistic interpretation of 
science. Science may have developed a more accurate scientific 
skill; its eonclusion that benge is a natural poison may be 
"true" and the Zande belief in oracles ufalse;" however, the 
trit~h of seienee is not due to its willin!ne.. to be detached 
from belief or its refusal to interpret fact 11.'1 teras of belief. 
At this point it will be helpful to examine Polanyi's attitude 
toward scienee more closely. 
Science and Belief: 
Science takes place in a cODIIlUnity. Tne members of this 
community have been trained in the skills necessary to conduct 
research, appraise the value of problema, get new aod relevant 
idea., carry out experimental verifications, etc. This COlaU-
nity, through a cooperative effort, gradually builds a body of 
commonly accepted theories. The body of theory not only applies 
to the limited areas i1.'l whicb it bas been verified. but consti-
tutes a network of belief in terms of which scientists interpret 
reality. New facts are seen 1n the light of current scientific 
beliefs. New problems for. within thes. beliefs. These prob-
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lema are appraised by the criterion of this current scientific 
opinion. Discoveries are made out of the background of this 
framework of belief. Finally, evidence for verification is 
found and interpreted in the light of the.e beliefs. 
Thus the basic structure of knowledse working within the 
context of belief is present in science jUflt as it was found to 
be present in the Zande beliefs in oracles. Science does not 
obsene "pure fact" from a detached viewpoint any more than the 
Zande do. Scientists consider facts fr~ within the framework of 
c~~·~~t u~lentiflc belief. Prom thls standpoint, with its in-
herent bias, they decide whether facts are important and rele-
vant, whether they are worth a closer study or are to be ignored. 
Polanyl outlines a few historical examples which bring out his 
point. 
1) In june of 1947, Lord Rayleigh, a distinguished fellow 
of the Royal Society, published a paper (in Proceedings of the 
Royal Society) describing SOrDe simple experiments which proved 
in the author's opinion that a hydrogen atom impinging on a metal 
wire could transmit to it energies ranging up to 100 electron-
volts. Polanyi points out that if such an observation were cor ... 
rect it would be of revoluti0D4ry importance. Yet when the paper 
came out :SC ientists in general would not believe in the theory. 
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Though they could not explain the results, they did not think it 
worth while even to repeat the experiment. They simply ignored 
it. Since then Lord Rayleigh has died and the matter seems to 
have been completely forgotten. Po18nyi attributes this neglect 
to the incompatibility of the proposed th~ory with current beliefs 
regarding the nature of atomic processes. 1 
Stmultaneously with Rayleigh's paper, another paper was 
published by Professor P.M.S. Blackett. He pOinted out a simple 
relationship which exists between angular" momentum and stellar 
magnetism as applicable to the earth. the sun and a third star. 
This communication was meagre as compared with Rayleigh's. None-
theless, it was received by scientists as an important discovery 
, 
justifying further exploration. 
Po18nyi claims that thirty years earlier the reactf.ons to 
these two papers would have been shrugged aside as just one more 
curious numerical coincidence. On the other hand, Lord Rayleigh's 
observation would have been accept~d at face value, since it 
would not have stood in contradlctio,: to aeeepted beliefs. 2 
2) Another example occurred itl the early 1900's. Arrhenius 
had postulated a chemical equilibrium between the dissociated and 
1Polanyi. -'The Nature of Scientific Convictions," 16. 
2Ibid• 17. 
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the undissociated forms of an electrolyte in solution. From the 
very beginniq the measurements showed that this equilibrium was 
true for weak electrolytes like acetic acid. but not for the prom 
inent group of strona electrolytes, like common salt or sulphuric 
acid. For 80me 30 years theae discrepancies weTa tabulated, yet 
no one thouaht of qtlestionir-a the theory which they 50 flagrantly 
contradicted: 
Scientists were satisfied with apeaking of the uanomali~8 0 
strona electrolytes ... without doubting for a moment that 
their behaviour was in fact governed by the law that they 
completely failed to obey. I can still remember my own 
amazement when, about 1919, I first heard the idea mooted 
that the anomalies were to be reaarded .s a refutation of 
the laws postulated by Arrhenius and to be explained by a. 
different theory. Not until this alternative conceptlon 
(baaed on the mutual eletrostatic interaction of the ions) 
wa. successfully elaborated in detail, was the previOUS 
theory generally abandoned. l 
Po1any1 points out that contradict1ons to scientific theory 
are often disposed of by calli. them "anomaUea." Theae contra-
dictiona are thus explained away or 1Itaore4 because they are con-
sidered unimportant or Dealiaible. This process is similar to 
the way the zande explain away contradictions to their belief in 
oracles. Such a procedure is not only a fact in science, but 
very otten proves justified when nanomalies" are explained by a 
IPolanyi, ''The Stabili.ty of Beliefs," 228. 
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subsequent re-interpretation of the original theory.l 
3) Some years ago there appeared in Nature a table of 
figures proving with a great deal of accuracy that the time of 
gestation of a number of animals is a multiple of the number • 
However. an exact relationship of this kind makes no impression 
on the moc1ern scientist, and no conceivable amount of further 
evidence would convince htm of such a relationship. Polanyi 
points out that the rejection of such a relationship expresses a 
comparatively recent belief of science. He suggests that a 
scientist like Kepler would by no means have relarded it as ab-
surd.2 
4) Polanyi indicates that beliefs will be held in the face 
of strong contradictory evidence, even when the belief is still 
in a very hypothetical stage. The positivistic idea that a 
scientist drops a hypothesis the moment it conflicts with ex-
perience is pure myth. No true scientist would act in so clumsy 
a manner. 
Niels pf)~): did not drop his th~ory of spectra, which was 
confirmed only by one sinale type of atom -- that of hydro-
sen -- and broke down at the very next step, when applied 
lIbid. 228-229. 
--
2Micbael Palanyl, "Scientific Beliefs, It Ethics, LXI (Oc-
tober, 1950), 34. 
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to heltm. The periodic system of elements could be fitted 
into it only in the reverse sequence of their atomic 
weights. Chemistry held on firmly to the cyclic formula of 
benzene proposed by Kekule in 1859, even though it became 
clear, as the years passed by, that the two different di-
substituted derivatives which it postulated did not, in 
fact, exist •. Scientists will often tolerate such contra-
dictions to their theory, regarding them as anomalied •••• 
The SCientist's decision depends on the strength of the 
beliefs in the light of which he interprets his observa-
tions II and we approve of this decision if we share these 
beliefs. 1 
Thus Polanyi would conclude that all knowledge, whether it 
be carried on by a scientist or an Azande, takes place 10 a con-
text of belief. Fact and evidence are interpreted in the light 
of belief. Discovery and verification are carried on in this con 
text. Science can disagree with the Zande belief in oracles. but 
it cannot quarrel with the process by which the lande build up a 
system of beliefs and carry 011 their activity of knowing within 
the framework of their beliefs. For science exhibits a similar 
process in its own knowing. 
The A-Critical Nature of Belief: 
The previous comparison of the beliefs of lande and of 
Science has suggested that the process of knowiDg takes place 
always within a framework of belief. One does not attempt to 
pursue knowledge from a detached pOint of view; but be uses 
lIbid. 29-30. 
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his language, his skills, his tradition, and the assistance of hie 
cODIIlunity in attempting discovery, verification, demonstration or 
criticism. Since the critical movement in Imowledge must itself 
be pursued from within such a framework of belief, the beliefs 
themselves stand outside that critical movement. Thus it follows 
that belief is looked upon as a-critical. This section will ex-
amine the a-critical nature of belief more closely. 
The a-critical element comes out moat clearly in the area 
of language. \~1en one talks about the i4eather, he concentrates 
upon what be ia aay1n& about the weather. However, in speaking 
he ia using a very complicated system of lanauage which baa been 
developed over the centuries, contains an implicit theory of the 
universe, and must be used accordina to certain rules. The 
speaker is not concentratina on any of these elements as he dis-
courses about the weather. He does not consider the complicated 
system he is usina nor the fact that it has been handed down to 
him from earlier generations. He does not think. at the moment. 
of its contaioing an implied view of the universe nor does he .ak 
htmaelf about the correctness of that interpretation of the uni-
verse. He does not reflect upon the fact that even the catego-
ries he is usina to describe the weather have been given him by 
his language. He does Dot consciously consider the grammatical 
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rules which guide sentence structure nor the meanings of indi-
vidual words, as he construc.ts sentences and uses wo'rds. to speak 
of the weather. In all this he concentrates upon the weather and 
what he wishes to say about it, and everything else forms the 
framework of belief from within which he vie,~s the '+"eather. In 
this instance the framework of belief is obviously used a-criti-
cally. 
However, it is PQssible for one to reflect upon bis own 
activity and speak precisely of the various elements that make up 
the framework of belief. One CaD speak of his lanauaae. of 'r .... 
matical rules, of his own use of those rules. Furthermore, this 
reflection can be critical. That is, one can, after uttering a 
sentence, ask himself whether he used his languase correctly in 
utterlQ& the sentence. Or one could ask in reflection whether 
the lanauaae he used to describe a given situation was actually 
adequate to tlmt situation. One might decide that it is neces~ 
eary to find a new symbolic sy.tea to apeak adequately of the 
situation.. However. the very act of deciding that a new symbol-
ism is required to handle a particular problem, will be done in 
terms of words and a lanauage which form & framework of belief 
for this act. There i. no end to the amount of critical reflec-
tion which can be attempted. nor is there any element in the 
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linguistic framework of belief which cannot be reflected upon 
critically; however,that very critical reflection must have its 
own framework of belief. It is ~possible to step entirely out-
side of a framework of belief, to become completely detached. For 
the unfolding of the mind, even the most critical unfolding of the 
mind, requires a language in ter.ms of which it unfolds, and this 
language forms a framework of belief. 
So long as we use a certain language, all questions that we 
can ask will have to be f~lated in it and will thereby 
confirm the theory of the universe which is implied in the 
vocabulary and structure of the languqe. It follows that 
we cannot state without self-contradiction within a language 
any doubt in respect to the theory implied by the language. 
The only way to dissent from the theory of the universe 
implied in a language i8 to abandon some of its vocabulary 
and to learn to speak a new language instead. l 
A skill is similarly part of the a-critical framework of 
belief. Take the instance of the gOlfer. As he concentrates 
upon hitting the ball, he skilfully uses his muscles, Sight, and 
touch - ... and these form what could be called a framework of be-
lief for bis activity. Now even in an activity like golf there 
can be a type of critical reflection. One can discover that he 
is not holding his left arm straight or that he is taking his eye 
off the ball. In fact with tlle help of a good coach, the slight-
est detail can be brought to a person' attention. It may be pos-
........ 
lPolanyi, "Stability of Beliefs," 221-222. 
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sible then for the golfer to work on this point, to give it more 
of his attention. Ult~tely this correcting process will be 
somewhat artificial and he will eventually have to come to the 
pOint where these activities can be performed correctly without 
concentrating on them. However, even when he is concentrating on 
correcting one element of his skill, he must rely on the other 
elements taking care of themselves. They now form the framework 
of belief within which he attempts to correct one or another flaw 
in his skill. It is not possible for him to be critically aware 
of all the elements of his skill as he performs them. And even if 
it were conceivable to reflect critically upon all the elements 
of one skill; other skills would be put to use in the process --
skills of perception, reflection, and judgment -- and these skills 
~~uld form the framework of belief for the critical activity. As 
in the case of language, it is impossible to step entirely outside 
the context of skill even when one is critically examining one's 
skill. 
Basically, it must be acknowledged, that all unfolding of 
human activity and human knowing takes place within a framework 01 
belief. The framework is used a-critically. Even critical activ. 
ity must take place in such an a-critical framework. It is logi-
cally impossible to have a complete critical awareness of the 
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unfolding of one's own activity at the moment when the unfolding 
takes place. Such an attempt could only lead to the destruction 
of meaningfulness • 
••• The present moment's belief can be rejected or modified 
by the next moment t s reflection, but this reflection, and 
its result, will be again an ultimate commitment, which 80 
far cannot have yet become the object of reflection or 
c:.'iticlsm. But cCllJlldtment must have duration. Any attempt 
to accompany it simultaneously by reflection i8 logically 
self-contradictory, and if we perSist, it results in the 
disintegration of our person. If we cannot lose ourselves 
at all, but feel compelled to observe ourselves in all we 
do, we become disembodied in the manner which Sartra has 
penetratingly described •••• The result 1s not a superior 
de~ee of detachment, but an impotent nihilism. l 
Belie~ and_ .. C~e!leDfd,on: 
It only remains to situate belief within the structure of 
"comprehension. It All knowln& and all activity are mgulated by a 
tacit skill which integrated subsidiary elements in terms of a 
focus. Subsidiary elements are not y~ directly, 10 themselves; 
but they are interiorized and known in terms of a foeal unity. 
By interiorizinc subsidiary elements one "dwells within" them to 
know their focal integration. A person dwells prtmarily within 
his own body, to know thinas other than htmaelf. And he dwells 
within his lanauage and his tools. as ~xtensiODS of his body t to 
attain more sophisticated knowledge and more skilful activity. 
IPolanyi, tiThe Nature of Scientific Convictions," 22. 
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The language of one t s culture and the tools and other sub-
sidiary elements 'l:mich are interiorized in various knowing activ-
ities form a framework of beliefs. One dwells tdthio these be-
liefs in interpreting the t<1Orld, in choosing fruitful problems, 
in working toward a solution, in arriving at a discovery, or in 
the mor~ critical type of reflection and verification. In all 
these activities the mind unfolds by integratina subsidiary ele-
ments. It unfolds in terms of language and skill. It unfolds 
by dwelling within certain elements in order to know their inte-
gration. It unfolds a-critically, from within its beliefs. 
Thus the subsidiary framework, from within which one at-
tempts to know, constitutes always a framework of belief. This 
framework of belief is a-critical because it 1s known subsidiaril, 
and integrated tacitly. The framework of belief is fundamental 
to all knowing, for all kftO\'ling is achieved by dwelling within 
subsidiary elements and all lcnm4ing proceeds by integrating these 
subsidiary elements tacitly_ The idea of a completely detached 
knowledge would be one which did not integrate subsidiary ele-
ments, which had no subsidiary framework, no :1.nteriorlzationJ no 
indwelling. If it is true that all knowing is comprehensive in 
structure. tben it is equally true that all knowledge is founded 
in belief, and there is no sucb thing as a completely detached 
and i.mperaonal objectivity. 
v. COMPREHENSION AND THE MODERN AGE. 
The first four chapters of this paper have examined the 
nature of comprehension, its structure, its fundamentally a-criti-
cal character, the 1~1ts of the critical element, and the various 
types of knowing that are integrated into it. This final chapter 
will attempt to examine Polanyi's idea of comprehension in rela-
tion to one of the major problems of the age, namely the tendency 
toward nihilism. There are two general areas where this nihilis-
tic tendency has been most evident: 1) religion and morality, 
where doubt is cast upon traditional values and beliefs; 2) the 
arts and social sciences whose meaninl is destroyed by an overly 
strict imposition of the methodology and ideals of the physical 
sciences. 
1) There has grown up in the age since the scientific revo-
lution a conflict between science and religion. If one were to 
look for an historical symbol it might well be found in the Gali-
leo incident; however, the conflict runs much deeper than any in-
cidents that can be pointed to. Polanyi points out that it has 
been a conflict of authority. "In medieval times you could sbat-
ter an opinion on the grounds that it was contrary to religion, 
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just as today you can do so by showing that it is contrary to 
science. The reason is obviously that the authority of religion 
has been tmpaired by the principle of doubt, while that of science 
has been rather increased by it."l 
This "principle of doubt" Polaoyi links with a critical and 
mechanistic movement which he traces all the way back to the 
Greeks. 2 This movement has appeared in many forms over the cen~ 
turies, but its basic principles can be stated briefly: It 
claims to accept only such beliefs as are founded on reason and 
experience. It seeks to eliminate error by the vigilant search-
light of doubt. And finally it is passionately hostile to uncrit-
ically held beliefs, which it regards as cources of superstition 
and fanaticism. 3 
Thus it is not science itself which is fundamentally respon-
sible for the deposition of relision's authority, but rather this 
critical movement which has somehow been identified with science 
in the present ace. Science is held to be the outcome and supreme 
justification of this critical method, and thus there is the tend-





ency to measure the validity of all other knowledge and belief by 
its conformity or lack of conformity with the methodolosy of the 
physical sciences. 
The shadow of doubt which first passed over religion has 
also passed over the realm of philosophy and thus has undermined 
the claims of morality. 
When the modern positivist says of a statement that it is 
metaphysical he means that it is nonsense. For the past 
fifty years it has been hammered into us with ever increas-
ing vigour that science is concerned only with verifiable 
statements and must be purified of all other elements, which 
are mere metaphysics. Viennese school of philosophy has 
generalized this principle into a universal critique of hu-
man utterances. It points out for example that if you say 
that it is wrong to bear false witness, you find that you 
have made a statement which cannot be proved by the facts. 
No chemical analysis or microscopic examination can prove 
that a man who bears false witness is immoral. Hence to 
call him immoral is either meaningless or no more than an 
exclamation of disgust, such as one may utter when biting 
at a worm inside an apple. l 
2) This critical movement and the tendency toward nihilism 
~ich is beginning to emerae from it has also penetrated the 
~ealms of the social sciences and art. If an historian is lauded 
on the grounds that his work is truly scientific, this will be ac-
cepted as a relevant term of praise. The historian will thus 
strive to be scientific. An educator, criticized on the grounds 
that his method is unscientific will consider this a dispar8la-
lIbid. 24. 
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ment. Often students of man will make desparate efforts to appear 
scientific, and some paycholol1sts have turned away from the stud, 
of conaciousness in order to become truly scientific. The econo-
mist 1s constantly worried about doubts .s to whether economics 1. 
really a science. The usual way of dealing with this problem is 
to claim that these are still "young" sciences. The implication 
is that as they mature they will come to resemble physics more aae 
more. Physics is thus acl~led&ed as the only truly exact sci-
ence, one which i8 strictly verifiable. 1 
MOdern art and music have felt the touch of the nibi1istic 
destruction of meaning. Both have arisen rebelliously as a de-
liberate rejection of socially accepted standards. This ase bas 
become so used to the spectacle that its uniqueness is seldom 
averted t~. Great artists of other ases have often sone unrecoI-
nized in their lifetime; however, never before bas a whole artis-
tic culture gone on flowering through successive lenerations in 
.ystematic opposition. It is Polanyi' s contention that they can ... 
not move indefinitely in this direction. 
MOderD art baa arisen fra. a persistently continued de-
struction of ex1atiqg artistic realities for the sake of 
penetrating to strata of harder. more genUin e fcmu of 
reality. So the "poetic" bas vanished from our poetry, the 
npicturesque" from our painting, the "harmonious" from our 
IIbid. 25. 
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music, the heroes and heroines from our novels and plays. 
All these were rejected in the pursuit of a harsher artisti 
truth. But can this process go on indefinitely? Must it 
not presently lead to a complete destruction of meaning?l 
This then is Polanyi's analysis of the central problem of 
the age. The critical movement, which has been productive of so 
much good, is threatening now to lead to nihilism and the destruc 
tion of reality: 
The critical imperative of rejecting any belief that can 
quite conceivably be doubted 114s become second nature with 
us. To assert any belief uncritically as a matter of our 
faith has come to be regarded as an offense against reason. 
We feel in it the menace of obscurantism and of an authori-
tarian restriction of free thou&ht. Belief 1~ science is 
the only belief left ~~ich ~re still feel entitled to hold 
on these grounds. So we are compelled to transpose all the 
rest of our beliefs into scientific teachings and ~4here 
this proves impossibl~ we try at least to dress them up as 
teachings of science. 
It is possible to translate this crisis of the age into 
terms of "comprehension." Fundamentally, the critical movement 
has not realized that all knowledge is comprehensive in character 
and thus is always rooted in subsidiary "beliefs." It has not 
apprehended tbat knowledge is a tacit activity of integration. 
Ideas 11ke tacit and subsidiary knawing ar.e something of a scan-
dal to it. It wants everything to be verifiable in the sense 
lrolanyi, "History and Hope," l5-16. 
2polanyi, "Science and Faith," 30. 
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that the evidence for any position is explicit and focal. 
What is needed is a conceptual renewal which grasps know-
ledge as an act of comprehension, rooted in tacit and subsidiary 
knowing. The critical element must be seen as itself an act of 
comprehension, and thus in principle always limited in effective-
ness, always incomplete, always capable, in excess, of leading to 
the destruction of meaning. 
What we have to do now seems to me quite obvious. We must 
get rid of the obsession which forbids us to believe any-
thing that we could conceivably doubt. The critical move-
ment which we inherited from Greece has brought us inuooas-
urable benefit through the past centuries. It was the 
battle-axe of intellectual honesty, of free thouaht and of 
lndependent personality. But the beneflts of this movement 
are nearing exhaustion while its dangers are &rowina fast. 
In the west it has forced u. into an intellectual masquer-
ade, a pretense of a scientific justification of our be-
liefs J which weakens and debauches them. In the East it 
has reached its logical terminus in a combination of nihi-
list theory and fanatical action. l 
~~e V!n~catlon of Real~tl: 
The first half of this chapter has examined the age's tend-
ency toward nihilism, toward the dest.ruction of meaning, and thus 
toward the destruction of reality. It has so exhalted physical 
science that it haa reduced all other reality to the level of 
physical reality. Everything can be explained in terms of atomic 
lIbid. 34-35. 
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theory, and anything that cannot is not real. Thus man is a 
physical and chemical reality. To speak of him as a conscious 
being, a moral beins, or a religious being is to be mystical or 
metaphorical, it is not to speak of reality. 
The second half of the chapter will go on to show bow Po-
lanyi, 1n affirming knowledge as comprehension, vindicate. a 
reality of various levels -- physics, engineering, biology, 
psychology, morality, religion. The difference between physics 
and engineering, and the levels of reality with which they deal) 
will be explained as an instance of bow the theory of comprehen-
sion leads to a vindication of a many-leveled reality. 
It is Polanyi's contention that scientific analysis and the 
critical movement destroy higher levels of reality by reducing 
them to their focal particulars. The higher levels consist of 
comprehensive entities wh1ch can ooly be grasped by taking the 
particulars of lower levels subsidiari1y in comprehending the 
higher levels. An instance on taking the particulars of a lower 
level focally makes it tropossible to grasp the comprehensive 
realities of a higher level. 
My vindication of reality will consist in showing that the 
universe is in fact such that my conception of knowing is 
appropriate to it; that there do in fact exist higher 
levels of reality composed by comprehensive entities, which 
include prinCiples that are absent in the lower levels of 
reality composed of the kind of particulars which contriD-
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ute to the comprehensive entities. This is why, by rely-
ing on our awareness of the particulars situated on a 
lower level of reality, we can apprehend the comprehensive 
entities on a hig;her level of reality, but cease to see 
the.se if \M desist from using our powers of comprehension 
and loOk instead at the particulars in themselves. We 
shall vindicate reality by repudiating the obsession of 
scientific rationaliSf with tangible particulars which 
leads to Itbsurdities. 
Take the instance of a machine (the object of the science 
of engineering), for example, a typewriter, cart watch or clock. 
A machine i8 defined in terms of its operational principles. 
These principles state the purpose of machine -- the function of 
its parts as they interact to achieve some purpose. If a machine 
is a reality, it is a reality wil1ch must be defined in terms of 
its operational principles. 
If YOll have an idea for a new machine you will define it 
in the terBS of its operational prinCiples and you may 
claim a patent founded on this description of it. In ap-
plying for a patent you will carefully avoid any reference 
to material of which you have made such a machine, or 
think it would be best made; for if you do this, your 
patent could be circumvented by a competitor making your 
machine from some other material. You would, in fact, 
have failed to define in all its generality the class of 
objects comprised by the conception of your mechine. 2 
If one were to eonsider the parts of a machine in them-
selves. as inanimate objects of the science of physics, he could 




never arrive at the operational principles of the machine. Take 
a machine apart and a110'\.'/ a. team of physicists to examine its 
parts in great detail in terms of their science of physics. They 
will never be able to tell in terms of physics whether the object 
Is a machine~ and if so, TI1hat purpose it serves and bow. Thus 
they will never grasp the operational prinCiples lihich define the 
machine. The particulars, lvhich they are taking focally to com .. 
prebend the atomic structures of these objects, must be grasped 
subsidiarily to comprehend the operational principles of the 
machine. 
The operational prinCiples define a machi.ne in terms of it. 
purpose. Thus in terms of the operational principles one can 
decide when a machine has failed to achieve its purpose. How-
ever, the operational principles themselves cannot explain the 
cause of the failure to achieve its purpose. 'Ibis must be dis ... 
covered on a lower level. 
To understand these failures of a machine we must descend 
to an enquiry on the lower level formed by the parts of the 
machine, as mere inanimate bodies. In other words, we must 
call 10 physics and chemistry and examine the parts by the 
methods of these sciences. But this must be a peculiar 
kind of physics and chemistry: a use of physics and chemis-
try expressly bearing on the operational principles of the 
machine. In this ancillary role, whicb is called t!Plied 
Phxsics and Chemist!i' these sciences caa supply t Inlor-
matr-on-neeessarily nored by the operational principles of 
a machine. This is how engineers use physical and chemical 
investigations for establishing opttmal conditions for the 
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cons;~-::-uet:1on and working of a machint~ and for learning to 
avoid its breakdown. l 
Thus two different branches of science refer to these two 
levels within a machine. Engineering studies the machine as a 
machine. that is in terms of its operational principles. Pure 
physics might study the parts of the machine, but this study 
would have no relation to the machine as a machine. An applied 
physics can study the parts of the machine in relation ot its 
operational principles, in the sense that it studies the optimal 
conditions for the workins of those principles. 
Thus a machine can only be known by relying on the subsidi-
ary awareness of its particulars to grasp comprehensively ita 
operational principles. To refuse to attempt this act of com-
prehenSion, to approach a machine analytically and critically, 
attending focally to tts more tangible particulars, ia to fail 
to grasp this higher level of reality_ To vindicate the various 
levels of reality from physics to relis1·t.ml one must uphold tacit 
and subsidiary knowing, as well as explicit and focal knowing. 
One must give to each of these its proper place within theinte. 
sral structure of comprehension. By doing this Polanyi enables 
the age once again to affirm the full richness of a mult11eveled 
· .... " ..... 
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reality alon~ '.Jith ~.he Intall\.~etual 41'\d cultural values which are 
part of its tradition. 
Modem m:m 18 'Jl'lprecedented; yet we muat now go back to St. 
Augu$tine to restore the balance of our cognitive powers. 
In the fourth century A.D. St. Augustine brought tbe bistoe, 
of Greek philosophy to close by inaugurating for the firat 
time a po8t-01:1t1041 phl1oaopb),.. He tauaht tbat all know ... 
leq_ was a gUt of grace, for which we must strive UDder 
the au1dance of .Dteeedent belief: Hiai Cred.14erltis. Hoa 
~Dtel..1.!Il~s.. • ..... We ate' now l'ecOiihi bille! oace _e 
as tne source of all kDOWlecae. Tacit a$$$Dt ao4 iDtellec. 
tual pasalO1U:; the ahal'lng of aD 1dica ad of a cultural 
heritage, affiliation to 4 lUte-minded community: such are 
the impulses which shape out' vision of the nature of thins_ 
on whiob we rely for our .'tery of th1Q&s. No lntell1&eraoa. 
however cr1tica.1 ft yriS1Dal, caD operate outside such a 
fiduciary framework. 
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